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I.  INTRODUCTION:  WHY THE HISTORY MATTERS 
What should military commanders be allowed to attack in the midst of 
armed conflict?  Debates on this question usually invoke the most recent 
and most comprehensive international convention on the law of armed 
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conflict, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,1 completed in 
1977 (usually designated, “AP–I”).  The convention lays down a sweeping 
“Basic Rule” prohibiting all intentional attacks on “the civilian population 
and civilian objects.”2  It then offers a back-up to this rule to cover 
“incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, [and] damage to civilian 
objects.”3 Even an attack not aimed at civilians is prohibited when it “may 
be expected to cause incidental” civilian loss or damage “which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”4  Commentators refer to this rule as the “principle  of 
proportionality.”5 
Recent commentators have described the principle as a “paradox,” for 
requiring some constant ratio of entirely different speculative assessments 
(“expected” loss or damage vs. “anticipated” military advantage).6  Others 
have called it “mysterious”7 and “extremely subjective.”8 
For some commentators, however, it is quite simple.  To cite the most 
notable example, the Commentary on the Additional Protocols published 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross9 insists that the 
proportionality rule “does not provide any justification for attacks which 
cause extensive civilian losses and damages.  Incidental losses and damages 
should never be extensive.”10 
The Red Cross speaks with some authority because it played the leading 
role in preparing the agenda for the Geneva Conference that drafted AP–
I.11  Apart from that, the Red Cross view has obvious appeal for advocates 
 
 1.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter AP–I], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 711–61 (Dietrich 
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT]. 
 2.  Id. at art. 48. 
 3.  Id. at art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 272–80 (2010); YORAM 
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 128–29 
(2004). 
 6.  MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
28–29 (2014). 
 7.  Enzo Cannizzaro, Proportionality and the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 332 (Andrew Clapham 
& Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
 8.  Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage, 7 YEARBOOK OF 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 35, 55 (2004). 
 9.  COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yvez Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter RED CROSS 
COMMENTARY]. 
 10.  Id. at 626, § 1980. 
 11.  Id. at 587–89; GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW SINCE 1945, at 341–47 (1994). 
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of humanitarian protection in conflict zones (as for advocates on the 
opposing side in a conflict). If the Red Cross view of proportionality is 
sound, outsiders can quickly and easily pronounce judgments on complex 
conflict situations. 
Disputes about recent conflicts in the Middle East illustrate this view. 
In each of Israel’s extended military campaigns over the past decade— 
against Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon in 2007, against Hamas forces in 
Gaza in 2009 and 2014—most western governments acknowledged that 
rocket attacks on Israeli civilians justified some active measures of self-
defense.12  Still, critics in European and UN forums insisted that Israel’s 
actual responses were “disproportionate,” hence in violation of the law of 
armed conflict.13  As critics see it, the first photo evidence of maimed 
women and children or collapsed houses can preempt any need for 
 
 12.  See, e.g., Press Release, Joint Statement by the President of the European 
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, Jose 
Manuel Barroso in the name of the European Union on the situation in Gaza (Aug. 3, 
2014), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ 
ec/144223.pdf  (“We strongly condemn continued rocket fire over Israel” as “an unacceptable 
threat to its citizens” but “legitimate defence needs to maintain proportionality.”); Press 
Release, Secretary Council Debates Escalating Crisis Between Israel, Lebanon; UN 
Officials Urge Restraint, Diplomacy, Protection of Civilians, SC/8776 (July 14, 2006)  
(acknowledging Israel’s right to strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon in self-defense) 
[hereinafter: Press Release on Crisis Debate]; Lizzie Dearden, Israel-Gaza conflict: 
William Hague calls for ceasefire but says Israel ‘has the right to defend itself,’ THE 
INDEPENDENT (UK) (July 12, 2014),  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ 
israelgaza-conflict-william-hague-calls-for-ceasefire-but-says-israel-has-the-right-todefend-itself- 
9602121.html; Kofi Annan Addresses Middle East Violence, WASH. POST (July 20, 2006, 
12:35 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/20/AR20060720 
00912.html (acknowledging Israeli right to act in self-defense against rocket attacks from 
Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon). 
 13.  See, e.g., Press Release, Statement by the Spokesperson on rocket fire from Gaza on 
on-going retaliation operations of the Israeli Defence Forces 140708/02 (July 8, 2014), 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140708_02_en.pdf  (“The EU 
strongly condemns the indiscriminate fire into Israel by militant groups in the Gaza Strip.  
The EU deplores the growing number of civilian casualties . . . caused by Israeli retaliatory 
fire”); Press Release, European Union Presidency Statement on Escalation of Violence in 
Gaza (Mar. 2, 2008), available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/25D22CBC70 
EAD218852574010056004B (condemning “disproportionate use of force by the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) against Palestinian population in Gaza”); Press Release on Crisis 
Debate, supra note 12 (Denmark, Belgium, Argentina, Spain acknowledge Israel’s right 
to act in self-defense but not when such acts include “excessive” or “disproportionate 
measures”); J. KITTRICH, THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 79–83 (2008) (surveying similar responses from debate over Israeli responses to 
Hezbollah attacks in 2006). 
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complicated weighing of civilian suffering against “anticipated” security 
gains.  Thus, for critics it was not necessary to await any careful investigation 
of how loss or damage occurred, let alone weigh such losses against 
“anticipated military advantage.”  Similar denunciations have been hurled 
against U.S. drone strikes, which have killed civilians and damaged 
civilian structures along with terrorist leaders in Pakistan, Yemen, and 
elsewhere.14   
If this is what the proportionality requirement means, however, AP–I 
would seem to be a sharp break with past military practice.  Some critics 
have indeed depicted AP–I that way.15  The United States has never 
ratified AP–I, though it readily endorsed earlier conventions on the law of 
war.16  A few regional powers—notably, Israel, Turkey and Indonesia— 
also refrained from ratifying AP–I, though they had subscribed to earlier 
Geneva conventions.17   
The Red Cross does not endorse this view, however.  The Commentary 
depicts AP–I’s targeting requirements as a mere codification or clarification 
of long-accepted principles.18 Viewed as an expression of accepted 
customary law, AP–I could be regarded as binding even on States that 
have not ratified it.  That is the position urged by the Red Cross in a 2005 
treatise on Customary International Humanitarian Law.19 
It might seem quite implausible that the “proportionality” rule merely 
expresses a long-accepted principle.  Even the Red Cross Commentary 
acknowledges that military operations in the world wars, even on the 
Allied side, were often pursued with “indiscriminate” destructiveness.20 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, EUR. PARL. DOC. PV 2567 
(2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT 
+MOTION+P7-RC-2014-0201+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (characterizing targeted drone 
strikes as contrary to AP I). 
 15.  See Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A. F. L. REV. 1, 149–54 (1990) 
(does not focus on proportionality). See generally JOHN FONTE, SOVEREIGNTY OR 
SUBMISSION: WILL AMERICANS RULE THEMSELVES OR BE RULED BY OTHERS? 227–33 
(2011) (“Protocol I radically revises the Law of War”). 
 16.  For list of states subscribing to AP–I, see THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra 
note 1, at 785–91. The 1949 Geneva conventions did not deal with the conduct of military 
operations, but earlier Hague Conventions (1899, 1907) did and the United States 
subscribed to all of these conventions. Id. at 85–86, 648. 
 17.  All three ratified the four 1949 Geneva conventions.  Id. at 641, 647. Turkey 
also ratified the Hague Conventions before the First World War. Id. at 84, 86. Israel and 
Indonesia were not yet independent States at that time. 
 18.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 586. 
 19.  1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 46, 58 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) 
(customary rules embracing AP–I standards on proportionality). 
 20.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 586–87. 
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Then, there is the problem that no previous convention actually talked 
about “proportionality.”  Indeed, no previous convention contained any 
statement so sweeping as the “Basic Rule” in AP–I that “attacks” must 
never be directed at “civilians” or “civilian objects.”21  Until the Twentieth 
Century, Anglo-American authorities expressly rejected the claim that 
civilians and civilian objects must always be shielded from military 
efforts.22  The 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare 
correctly summarized the traditional American view when it explained, “a 
condition of war between two States” means “every national of the one 
State becomes an enemy of every national of the other.”23 
Concerns about protecting civilians from harm did not arise out of 
nowhere, however, and then somehow mesmerize delegates to the Geneva 
Conference in the mid-1970s.  As the previously mentioned 1956 U.S. 
Army Manual explains, “[I]t is a generally recognized rule of international 
law that civilians must not be made the object of attack directed 
exclusively against them.”24  The Manual even talks about proportionality: in 
the conduct of military attacks, “loss of life and damage to property must 
not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained.”25 
The U.S. Army did not embrace quite the same view as the Red Cross, 
however. Among other things, the 1956 Manual insisted that the “use of 
explosive ‘atomic weapons’ . . . cannot as such be regarded as violative of 
international law”26  The Red Cross Commentary belabors the seemingly 
obvious suggestion that the standards of AP–I implicitly prohibit resorting 
to nuclear weapons, since they will inevitably wreak “excessive” loss and 
damage to civilians.27  Yet when ratifying AP–I, many western States 
included explicit reservations stipulating that they did not regard it as 
prohibiting resort to nuclear weapons in all circumstances.28 
 
 21.  See AP–I, supra note 1, art. 48. 
 22.  See Jeremy Rabkin, Anglo-American Dissent from the European Law of War: 
A History with Contemporary Echoes, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2014). 
 23.  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27–10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
16 (1956). 
 24.  Id. The qualifying term “exclusively” may signify a considerable restriction in 
the force of the statement. 
 25.  Id. at 19, art. 41. 
 26.  Id. at 18, art. 35. 
 27.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 589–96. 
 28.  Canada, for example, when ratifying AP–I, stipulated in its understanding that 
AP–I provisions were “intended to apply exclusively to conventional weapons” and “do 
not have any effect and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.” THE LAWS 
OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 797. For similar declarations, see ratifying statements of 
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The argument of this article is that the proportionality rule in AP–I does 
express a doctrine that has real roots in western military practice, but it 
was not traditionally understood as the severe constraint on military 
operations that the Red Cross propounds.  The western States at the 
Geneva drafting conference did not resist the proportionality rule.  In fact, 
they were active sponsors of that formulation.29  They understood that rule 
to be consistent with past practice, including most Allied tactics in the 
world wars.30  At the time of the drafting conference, World War II was 
still within the personal memory of most delegates and even within the 
professional experience of some delegates.  They understood that they 
were tightening humanitarian constraints in some ways, but did not think 
they were totally rewriting the law of war.31 
The history matters for more than insight into the “original understanding” 
of the treaty text.  Past views were based on experience.  More precise 
modern weapons—and greater dependence of civilians on complex support 
systems—make it reasonable to seek greater constraints on the conduct of 
war.  The challenges of armed conflict are not magically transformed, 
however, merely because many States ratify a diplomatic instrument.  Where 
earlier conventions were cautious, evasive, or silent, that was often in 
recognition of genuine difficulties that an overly clear and comprehensive 
rule would entail.32  Rules that are unrealistic are not likely to achieve 
humanitarian ends.  Therefore, it matters that understandings of the relevant 
history rest on sounder footings than the fanciful fables spun by the Red 
Cross. 
Section II starts with an analysis of the legal codifications developed to 
regulate war before World War I.  The codifications did gesture toward 
notions of “military necessity” that might be seen as precursors to 
 
France, id. at 800; Germany, id. at 802; Italy, id. at 807; Netherlands, id. at 810; Spain, id. 
at 813; United Kingdom, id. at 815; and United States, id. at 817. 
 29.  See infra, Part V.  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, for example, makes this acknowledgement in the Preamble; “It has not . . . been 
found possible at present to concert regulations covering all the circumstances which arise 
in practice . . . .  Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high 
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience.”  None of the sources invoked here—“usages among civilized 
peoples,” “laws of humanity,” “dictates of public conscience” had very clear or settled 
meaning. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land preamble, 
Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 60–82 
[hereinafter 1907 Version]. 
RABKIN-EICADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:16 PM 
[VOL. 16:  263, 2015]  Proportionality in Perspective 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 269 
“proportionality” requirements, but these were not very constraining.  
Section III looks at actual military practice by British and American forces 
in Twentieth Century wars (prior to the 1970s), demonstrating that there 
was far more continuity, even in the most destructive tactics, than the Red 
Cross version of “custom” would allow.  Section V continues this 
historical account with a focus on the bombing of cities during and after 
the Second World War. 
Section V traces the development of international legal standards for 
bombing in the half century before the Geneva conference that drafted 
AP–I and during the Geneva deliberations in the 1970s.  This survey again 
highlights the conformity of actual AP–I language with a rather permissive 
approach.  Section VI shows that, even in moral terms, applying the same 
standards to all conflicts against all enemies was not the traditional view 
and the embrace of such an indiscriminate view in the 1940s severely 
damaged the reputation of the Red Cross (though it did not affect its 
subsequent postures).  Section VII shows that, even in legal terms, the 
strict interpretation of the proportionality requirement has proven very 
difficult to implement.  Section VIII offers, in conclusion, a general warning 
against seeking more legal clarity than the realities of war can sustain. 
II.  THE NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES:  THE MEANING OF 
PROHIBITIONS ON PILLAGE AND WANTON                                                 
DESTRUCTION 
Prior to the completion of AP–I in 1977, the most general codifications 
of the law of armed conflict were those found in the Hague Regulations.  
The Hague Convention on the Law and Custom of War on Land33 was 
agreed to at the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, then reaffirmed 
(with minor changes) at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.34  The 
actual rules in both conventions appeared in an appendix, known as the 
Regulations. 
The Preamble in both Hague Conventions explains that the purpose is 
to provide “general rules of conduct” designed to “diminish the evils of 
war so far as military necessities permit”.35  At first glance, the Regulations 
 
 33.  Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
Annex, July 29, 1899, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 60–
82 [hereinafter 1899 Version]. 
 34.  1907 Version, supra note 32. 
 35.  Id. at 61. 
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seem to offer a jumble of disparate restrictions aimed at an unrelated set 
of “evils.”  However, that surface impression conceals an underlying 
logic. 
The section of the Hague Regulations on the conduct of military 
operations—“Means of Injuring the Enemy”36—contains only seven 
articles, but the significance of these provisions is illuminated by longer 
sections that precede it and follow it. The Regulations begin with a far 
longer, sixteen articles section elaborating humanitarian treatment of prisoners 
of war.37  The underlying theme is that captivity aims to remove enemy 
soldiers from contributing to the fight in this war— not in all future wars.38  
The Regulations end with a comparably extended set of provisions (fifteen 
articles) on occupation of enemy territory.  The general theme is that 
occupation aims to withhold territory from the enemy—not to change the 
status or allegiance of occupied citizens and their property prior to the 
settlement of future peace terms.  Occupying armies are, among other 
things, prohibited from forcing local civilians to assist in the military 
efforts of the occupying force.39 
The central section on “Hostilities” applies this perspective to the 
battlefield.  It prohibits use of “poison or poisoned weapons,”40 then 
emphasizes the point by separately prohibiting any other weapons “calculated 
to cause unnecessary suffering.”41  It prohibits attempts to “kill or wound 
an enemy who has . . . surrendered.”42  It then re-emphasizes this prohibition 
by forbidding armies “to declare that no quarter will be given”43; that is, 
 
 36.  Arts. 22–28, id. at 72–74. 
 37.  Arts. 4–20, id. at 67–72. “The Qualifications of Belligerents” are also of primary 
relevance to establishing “qualification” to be treated as a “prisoner of war,” while the 
immediately following provision, Art. 21, “The Sick and Wounded,” affirms protections 
of most relevance—as an international obligation—to prisoners of war.  So one might say 
21 of 56 provisions (in the 1907 version) are primarily concerned with combatants in 
captivity. 
 38.  Arts. 42–56, id. at 77–81.  Between this final section and the chapter on “Means 
of Injuring the Enemy,” there are a dozen miscellaneous provisions (29–41) on technical 
issues surrounding “hostilities”—provisions on “Spies,” “Flags of Truce,” “Capitulations,” and 
“Armistices.” 
 39.  Art. 44, id. at 78:  “Any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to 
take part in military operations against its own country is prohibited” (1899, version); “A 
belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish 
information about the army of the other belligerent or about its means of defense.”  (1907 
version).  Similarly, taxes imposed on the occupied population or territory can only be 
used for purposes accepted under the legitimate government or “for the needs of the army 
or of the administration of the territory in question”—not for general support of the 
occupying power. Id. at art. 49.  
 40.  Id. at art. 23(a). 
 41.  Id. at art. 23(e). 
 42.  Id. at art. 23(c). 
 43.  Id. at art. 23(d). 
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offering no chance to surrender.  All these prohibitions reflect the 
common purpose of directing combat operations at disabling the opposing 
force, instead of trying to ensure that wounded or captured combatants 
will never be able to offer resistance to the attacking army, even in a future 
war. 
Other restrictions have a similar logic.  The Regulations admonish 
armies not “to kill or wound treacherously.”44  Another provision then 
reemphasizes the point by prohibiting “improper use of a flag of truce, of 
the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy”45— 
particular instances of “treachery.”  The goal is to preserve trust in 
humanitarian restraints, so they can save lives in future battles or future 
wars. 
While all these prohibitions are phrased in absolute terms, the main 
protections for civilians are phrased in more qualified or conditional 
terms. 
Invading armies are admonished not to “destroy or seize the enemy’s 
property,”46 but then authorized to do precisely that, when “such destruction 
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”47 Again 
and again, the Regulations offer a similar balancing of prohibitions and 
authorizations.  So, a subsequent provision prohibits “attack or bombardment” 
of “towns, villages, dwellings or buildings” which are “undefended.”48  
The immediately following articles then discuss conditions for permissible 
“bombardment” of defended towns or villages.49  A later provision then 
admonishes that “steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes”50—on the 
evident assumption that ordinary “dwellings” or “buildings” may well be 
targets of “bombardment.” 
If these are considered early examples of “proportionality,” they 
indicate that “military necessity” may often justify harm to civilians and 
civilian objects.  The point seems to be that it is acceptable to use 
bombardment to force surrender of a particular place that is “defended” 
(that is, resisting capture).  It is not proper to torment an unresisting place 
 
 44.  Id. at art. 23(b). 
 45.  Id. at art. 23(f). 
 46.  Id. at art. 23(g). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at art. 25. 
 49.  Id. at arts. 26, 27. 
 50.  Id. at art. 27. 
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merely to coerce the rest of the enemy, using the captured place (or place 
that might be readily captured, because undefended) as hostage.  The 
Second Hague Peace Conference struck a similar balance in a convention 
on naval bombardment.51  That convention prohibits naval bombardment 
against undefended “ports, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings”52—
but then authorizes naval bombardment of precisely these targets, even 
when “undefended,” for the limited purpose of enforcing delivery of 
supplies “necessary for the immediate use of the naval force” involved.53 
In the Hague Regulations on land warfare, only three protections for 
civilians are framed as absolute prohibitions.  They may initially seem 
unrelated to each other or to earlier concerns.  First, there is a seemingly 
quite technical, almost legalistic prohibition on suspending the legal 
“rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.”54  Then there is a 
prohibition against trying “to compel the nationals of the hostile party to 
take part in the operations of war directed against their own country.”55  
Finally, there is an unqualified prohibition on the “pillage of a town or 
place, even when taken by assault.”56 
On reflection, one can see that all of these prohibitions reflect a 
common purpose, closely related to the aims of previous restrictions 
regarding prisoners of war and subsequent restrictions on occupation 
authority.  Ultimate political claims—regarding property and allegiance— 
are for governments to settle in peace treaties, not for commanders to 
impose in the midst of wartime battles.  Hence, the prohibitions on 
suspending legal claims and coercing enemy nationals into war service of 
the invader.  “Military necessity,” in the proper sense of the term, extends 
only to what is needed to compel the opposing government to come to 
 
 51.  Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 
Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1079. 
 52.  Id. at art. 1, 
 53.  Id. at art. 3.  The provision does require “due notice” of intent to bombard, after 
a “formal summons” to deliver supplies has been “made” and “the local authorities . . . 
decline to comply.” The absence of a similar provision in the Hague Regulations on land 
warfare seems to reflect the assumption that land forces would have adequate manpower 
to enforce requisitions of supplies in an occupied territory, while a naval force might not.  
So, coercive force is depicted as a last resort in the name of local military necessity. 
 54.  1907 Version, supra note 32, at art. 23(h). Some British commentators at the 
time protested that this prohibition would unreasonably restrict traditional practices of 
economic coercion. THOMAS E. HOLLAND, LAW OF WAR ON LAND 44 (1908). Another 
prominent British commentator defended the provision as addressed only to commanders 
in the field, leaving governments free to confiscate enemy property and nullify enemy 
contracts—citing Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as precedent.  A. PEARCE 
HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 253–65 (1909). 
 55.  1907 Version, supra note 32, at art. 23(h). The counterpart provision in the 1899 
Version is in art. 44. See 1899 Version, supra note 33, at art. 44. 
 56.  1907 Version, supra note 32, at art. 28. 
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terms.  That seems to explain the prohibition on “pillage” as opposed to 
mere seizure or occupation.  Legitimate war measures aim to deprive the 
enemy of resources during the current conflict—not for all future time, 
when denial can be achieved without destruction.57 
Given the other restrictions, the prohibition on “pillage”—unrestrained 
destruction of a captured town or city—might have seemed to go without 
saying.  In fact, the Hague drafters took the trouble to say it twice; after 
prohibiting “pillage” in the section on hostilities, the Hague Regulations 
repeat the prohibition without any further elaboration in the section on 
authority in occupied territory.58 
This emphatic, repeated prohibition on pillage was not an idiosyncratic 
gesture of the Hague drafters.  One can see the central, symbolic resonance 
of this prohibition by tracing the lineage of the Hague provisions.  The 
preambles to both Hague Conventions acknowledge the “wise and generous 
foresight” of the Brussels Conference of 1874.59  That conference produced 
a “Declaration,”60 which was not adopted at the time as a formal treaty, 
but clearly provided the working draft for what became the Hague Regulations.  
The Brussels Declaration also prohibited pillage in two different places.61 
The Brussels Declaration drew, in turn, on the code issued to the Union 
Army during the American Civil War, known as the “Lieber Code,”62 after 
its principal drafter, the German émigré scholar, Francis Lieber.63  The 
Lieber Code, designed for the first mass army in American history, 
offered much more detail and explanation than the international codes, 
which encapsulated its main provisions. 
In the Lieber Code, the prohibition is more elaborate: 
 
 57.  Why not regard “pillage” of a captured place as a means to coerce others, when 
they see the consequences of resisting?  The unstated reason seems to be that such tactics 
would descend into an unlimited campaign to “terrorize” enemy civilians. 
 58.  1907 Version, supra note 32, at art. 47. 
 59.  Id. at preamble, ¶ 4. 
 60.  THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 21–28. 
 61.  See Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War art. 18, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, 
at 21–28 “[A] town taken by assault out not to be given over to pillage.” Id. at art. 38. 
“[P]illage is formally forbidden.” Id. at art. 39. 
 62.  FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE], reprinted in THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 3–20. 
 63.  See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2012) for background on the thought and career of Francis Lieber and the origins 
of the Code. 
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All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all 
destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all 
pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, 
maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death 
or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the 
offense.64 
The Lieber Code formulates a broader set of prohibitions in explaining 
the limits on “military necessity”: 
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering 
for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in 
fight, nor of torture to extort confessions.  It does not admit of the use of poison 
in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. 
Yet another provision tries to capture the underlying logic: 
The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are 
means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.  
Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.”65 
The Code is not overly squeamish.  It specifically authorizes “all 
destruction of property and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, 
travel or communication and of all withholding of sustenance or means of 
life from the enemy.”66  It does not shrink from spelling out the implication: 
“it is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed and unarmed, so that 
it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.”67  It sanctions seizure of 
private property for the “benefit of the army or of the United States.”68  
Such provisions prompted the Confederate Secretary of War to denounce 
the Code as justifying reversion to “the warfare of the barbarous hordes 
who overran the Roman Empire.”69 
Prepared for a country with limited military experience, the Lieber 
Code devotes considerable attention to explaining the rules it sets out.  It 
does not say that civilians must be spared. In fact, it does not ever even 
 
 64.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art. 44. 
 65.  Id. at art. 16. 
 66.  Id. at art. 15. 
 67.  Id. at art. 17. 
 68.  Id. at art. 38. 
 69.  Letter of James Seldon, Secretary of War, Confederate States of America, to 
Robert Ould, (June 24, 1863), reprinted in RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND 
THE LAW OF WAR 120–21 (1983).  Seldon was particularly indignant that the Code justified 
instigating slave revolts and “servile war” and that it justified devastation of agriculture 
and destruction of private property.  He took note of the fact that the Code “was proposed 
by a German professor” and seemed “the handicraft of one much more familiar with the 
decrees of the imperial despotisms of the continent of Europe than with the Magna 
Carta . . . the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
at 128. 
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use the term civilian.  However, it does insist that limits on war measures 
flow from the limited character of modern wars, reflecting the limited 
claims of modern governments: 
As civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily 
advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual 
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself . . . The principle has 
been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in 
person, property and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.70 
The Code then offers eight separate provisions explaining and elaborating 
the point.  In “remote times” and still among “barbarous armies” and 
“uncivilized peoples,” the “private individual of the hostile country” had 
to “suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every disruption of 
family ties.”71  By contrast, “modern regular wars of the Europeans and 
their descendants” follow a different rule because, “[m]odern times are 
distinguished from earlier ages by the existence, at one and the same time, 
of many nations and great governments related to one another in close 
intercourse.”72  So the “ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed 
state of peace.”73  It follows that “war has come to be acknowledged not 
to be its own end, but the means to obtain great aims of state or to consist 
in defense against wrong” and “the law of war imposes many limitations 
and restrictions on principles of justice, faith and honor.”74 
These explanations may sound somewhat complacent about the moral 
superiority of “civilized Europeans” compared with “the internecine wars 
of savages.”75  The central distinction, however, turns not on ancestry, but 
epoch.  It is, in effect, a set of norms reflecting the difference in outlook 
between “modern Europeans” and prior cultures – very much including 
prior cultures in Europe. 
By the standards of the Lieber Code, the Greek hoplites and Roman 
legions were “barbarous”—following the rule of “barbarous” armies that 
permitted murder, rape, and enslavement of defeated peoples. 
The Enlightenment congratulated itself on having reached a higher 
stage of civilization, while denouncing isolated survivals of (or relapses 
into) earlier modes.  The American Declaration of Independence accordingly 
 
 70.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art 22. 
 71.  Id. at art 24. 
 72.  Id. at art 29. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at art 30. 
 75.  Id. at art 29. 
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denounced the “savage” and “indiscriminate” warfare of Indians and the 
“barbarous” practices of the British, as inciting the Indians to attack the 
American colonists.  Thomas Jefferson himself confessed that the Spartan 
practices described in Thucydides and Xenophon reminded him of Indian 
warriors on the American frontier.76  In antiquity, the Greeks and Romans 
practiced what might modernly be called “indiscriminate slaughter,” a 
term discussed below.  
To take a few famous examples, Alexander of Macedon completely 
destroyed the city of Thebes to punish its citizens for resisting his authority.77  
Those who survived the military assault were sold into slavery.  Such 
conduct did not prevent later generations from calling him “Alexander the 
Great,” nor did it prevent Plutarch from telling of this episode in the book 
known to later generations as “Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans.”78  
Julius Caesar, ranked with Alexander in Plutarch’s work, massacred a million 
people in the conquest of Gaul and sold another million into slavery (at 
least, according to Plutarch).79  A recent book by a classical historian uses a 
modern word for such extreme tactics: “terror.”80 
The most famous ancient commanders aspired to conquest, not merely 
to military victory in a political conflict among nation-States.  The conqueror 
aspired to make opponents submit to him, totally and irrevocably.  His 
aim was to banish the idea of successful resistance, even in the future, 
while terrifying other peoples by example.  The point was not simply to 
coerce, but to conquer; not merely to subdue, but to subjugate.  Conquerors 
 
 76.  See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW liv–lv (William Beach 
Lawrence ed., 6th ed. 1855) (reprinting Jefferson letter to Wheaton, commenting on ancient 
warfare). 
 77.  For the most famous account, see Alexander in PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE 
NOBLE GRECIANS & ROMANS 808–09 (Clough ed., Modern Library Classics 1992). 
 78.  Plutarch’s work did not have that exact title in antiquity, but the adoption of that 
title by English translators in the 17th Century captures the spirit of Plutarch’s intent to 
offer up accounts of exemplary figures for moral instruction. Id. at xviii–xix. 
 79.  Id. at 863. 
 80.  BARRY STRAUSS, MASTERS OF COMMAND: ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL AND CAESAR 
AND THE GENIUS OF LEADERSHIP 12 (2012). Subsection on “Terror”: “the great commanders” 
engaged in “massacring entire cities” . . . “They were willing to kill innocents and 
everyone knew it. Id. at 12.  That too was the secret of their success.”  After Alexander 
defeated Greek mercenaries fighting for the Persians, he “executed most” of them: “He 
wanted to make a political more than a military point in order to discourage other Greeks 
from fighting for the Persians.”  Id. at 43.  Caesar’s account of his conquest of Gaul (The 
Gallic War) “drove home the power of “Caesar’s military. It was quick, efficient, ruthless, 
and utterly ready to commit acts of terror.” Id. at 45.  
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would impose complete control, even if that meant, as the Roman 
historian Tacitus reported, having to “make a desert and call it peace.”81 
Medieval crusades had something of this quality—indiscriminate 
slaughter, intended to shatter any hope of future resistance or recovery 
among defeated foes.82  Even in less apocalyptic struggles in Europe, as 
during the Hundred Years War in the 14th and 15th Centuries, it was 
common practice for successful sieges to culminate in “sacking” conquered 
towns in orgies of violence and destruction as a punishment for defying 
the besieging army and as an ominous lesson to the next place that might 
think of resisting the same army.83 
The Lieber Code implicitly links coercive force to victory—in the 
current war, on the assumption that “peace” is “the normal condition” of 
nations in “modern times,” while “war is the exception.”84  The Code does 
not draw the conclusion that modern wars must never injure civilians; 
instead, the Code accommodates a variety of harsh measures against 
civilians.  The Code does not even demand that accepted rules of restraint 
never be violated. The Code expressly acknowledges that violations of the 
law of war—“acts of barbarous outrage” by a “reckless enemy”—can be 
punished by retaliation in kind.85 It cautions, however, that such retaliation 
must “never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge,” lest “unjust and 
inconsiderate retaliation removes belligerents farther and farther from the 
mitigating rules of regular war” and so “nearer to the internecine wars of 
savages.”86  So, generally, “military necessity does not admit of cruelty— 
that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge.”  
And “in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility 
which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”87 
 
 81.  GERMANIA AND AGRICOLA OF TACITUS 88 (Oxford trans., 1922) (“To ravage, to 
slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire; and where they make a desert, they 
call it peace”—attributed to a Scottish chieftain denouncing the Roman practice). 
 82.  Robert Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR 33 (Michael Howard, 
et al. eds., 1994) (Wars against non-Christians  “fought by the rules whichs in antiquity 
had applied in the wars of the Romans,” allowed “the conquered [to] be slain or enslaved” 
with “no distinctions between combatants and noncombatants”).  
 83.  See id. at 38 (on sieges); see also Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the 
Fifth and The Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 26–30 (1982) (noting that Henry’s threats 
against Harfleur—including pillage, rape and murder—were characteristic of siege warfare).  
 84.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art. 29. 
 85.  Id. at art. 27. 
 86.  Id. at art. 28. 
 87.  Id. at art. 16. 
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Lieber did not invent any of these doctrines.  The same general doctrine 
was embraced in the first extended treatise on international law by an 
American writer—the first anywhere to use the new term, “international 
law.”88  Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law89 first appeared 
in 1836 and depicted the modern law of war as an application of 
fundamental principles.  Respect for private property and the rights of 
non-combatants was, by mutual consent of nations, the modern practice 
in war.90 Nevertheless, it was always subject to exceptions: 
The exceptions to these general mitigations of the extreme rights of war, considered 
as a contest of force, all grow out of the same original principle of natural law, 
which authorizes us to use against an enemy such a degree of violence, and such 
only, as may be necessary to secure the object of hostilities [i.e., current hostilities].  
The same general rule, which determines how far it is lawful to destroy the persons 
of enemies, will serve as a guide in judging how far it is lawful to ravage or lay 
waste their country.  If this be necessary, in order to accomplish the just ends of 
war, it may be lawfully done, but not otherwise.91 
The Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel made the same point in the mid-
18th century in his highly influential treatise The Law of Nations.92  Vattel 
was the principal authority on international law for Wheaton and Lieber 
and, decades earlier, for the American Founders.93  His treatise puts the 
point this way: 
A lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary to attain 
that end.  Whatever is done in excess of such measures is contrary to the natural 
law and must be condemned as evil before the tribunal of conscience.  Hence it 
 
 88.  Before the Nineteenth Century, the term in general use was “law of nations” (or 
counterpart phrases in other languages, adapted from the original Latin term, jus gentium).  
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution still referred to “the law of nations” in Art. I, sec. 8, 
cl. 10 (authorizing Congress to “define and punish offenses against the law of nations”).  
The new expression, “international law,” was coined by English legal reformer Jeremy 
Bentham in the late Eighteenth Century to emphasize that it was a law governing the 
relations between sovereign States, not a set of universal understandings about justice 
between individuals. 
 89.  HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH OF THE 
HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE (1836). The 8th edition of this work, edited by R.H. Dana was 
originally published in 1866, then reprinted by Oxford Univeristy Press in 1936.  All 
subsequent references are to this edition. 
 90.  Id. at 364, § 347.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE NATURAL LAW, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (Charles 
G. Fenwick trans., The Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758). 
 93.  Wheaton presented the first edition of his work as an updating of Vattel: 
“Advertisement to the First Edition,” reprinted in the Oxford University Press edition, 
supra note 89, at xix. On Lieber’s engagement with Vattel, see WITT, supra note 63, at 
183–86.  Lieber understood himself as embracing a more permissive approach to war 
tactics than Vattel, whom he called “Father Namby-Pamby.” Id. at 182, 235. 
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follows that certain acts of hostility may be justifiable or not, according to the 
circumstances.  What is perfectly innocent and just in one war, owing to peculiar 
conditions, is not always so on other occasions; right keeps pace with necessity, 
with the demands of the situation; it never goes beyond those limits.94 
Wheaton thus devoted half a dozen pages in his treatise to a demonstration 
that the British army violated international law when it burned public 
buildings in Washington, D.C. toward the end of the War of 1812.95  If 
Wheaton had viewed the destruction of civilian objects as wrong in all 
circumstances, the indictment against the British action could have been 
concluded in one sentence.   
The logic is easy to understand if applied to pillage.  The Lieber Code 
seemed to think it applied to “assassination”96 and “torture,”97 as well— 
practices so shocking they would appear to the other side as a regression 
to “barbarism,” and therefore an obstacle to peace or to durable peace.  
This might seem a reflection of Victorian squeamishness or sentimentality.  
Yet, similar distinctions have been confidently asserted in recent debates 
about contemporary military tactics.  Critics denounced the Bush 
administration for practicing “torture” (or forms of “enhanced interrogation” 
equivalent to “torture”).98  A number of such critics then acquiesced to the 
Obama administration’s policy of escalating drone strikes, designed to kill 
terror suspects outright (and often killing their families or local bystanders, 
 
 94.  VATTEL, supra note 92, at 279. He seems to have been thinking of the 
“devastation” of farms and villages directed by the Duke of Marlborough in Bavaria, one 
of the most extensive “modern” episodes of the practice, some fifty years before Vattel 
composed his treatise. The same 1704 episode was described, with similar cautious 
approval by Winston Churchill, on the eve of the Second World War.  WINSTON 
CHURCHILL, IV MARLBOROUGH: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 58–60 (1935).  “It was not senseless 
spite or brutality, but a war measure deemed vital to success and even safety. . . It was, of 
course, incomparably less efficient than the destruction wrought by the Germans in their 
withdrawals from France and Belgium in our own times [i.e., in 1918].  But we must make 
allowances.” Id. at 60. 
 95.  WHEATON, supra note 89, at 371–75, §§ 348–52. 
 96.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art 148.  
 97.  Id. at art. 16.  
 98.  For recent arguments about the unique evil of torture, see David Sussman, 
What’s Wrong with Torture, PHIL. PUB. AFF. 1–33 (Winter 2005); Gunter Frankenberg, 
Torture and Taboo: Comparing Paradigms of Organized Cruelty, AM. J. COMP. L. 403–
22 (Spring 2008); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb, VA. L. REV. 
1425–61 (Oct. 2005); Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881–
918 (Summer, 2005). 
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as well).99  Whatever the mix of motives in contemporary political 
debates, the distinction has a long history.  The Framers of the U.S. Bill 
of Rights thought it important to prohibit “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
while still sanctioning capital punishment.100  The Lieber Code, while 
specifically prohibiting torture, also expressly endorsed capital punishment 
for certain offenses.101 
It might seem that the rejection of torture would also condemn threats 
of dire consequences—as a sort of mental torture.  The Lieber Code does 
not prohibit such threats as cutting off food to a besieged city or 
encampment.  In a similar way, contemporary critics of torture do not feel 
obligated to condemn plea-bargaining in the criminal justice system, even 
though the essence of plea bargaining, on the prosecutor’s side, is the 
threat to seek more severe penalties (or charges carrying more severe 
penalties) if the accused does not agree to a guilty plea.  Terror attacks or 
pillage are meant to inspire paralyzing fear rather than a reflective 
assessment of dangers.  The point of terror is to reduce the intended targets 
beneath the level of human reflection, so terrorism is not a mere synonym 
for threatening severe consequences.102 
If “proportionality” meant more than “not justified by military necessity,” 
it meant not justified by the military necessity of a modern war, which 
aims to secure victory in this war, without blocking a return to peace.  A 
modern war, however, presumed a modern enemy, prepared to negotiate 
peace when defeat of its organized armies made further resistance seem 
hopeless.  Enemies that fought differently were treated differently.  The 
Lieber Code was not followed by the U.S. Army in subsequent wars with 
Indian tribes on the western frontier, where burning of villages was a 
 
 99.  See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Harold Koh’s Slippery, Inadequate Criticism of 
the Drone War, THE ATLANTIC, May 9, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2013/05/harold-kohs-slippery-inadequate-criticism-of-the-drone-war/275692/. 
 100.  Compare U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment”) 
with amend. V (prohibiting taking of “life . . . without due process” and requiring indictment by 
“grand jury” for “capital crime”—implying capital punishment can be lawful if imposed 
according to procedural requirements). 
 101.  On “torture,” see LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art. 16. On the death penalty, 
see id. at art. 44.  
 102.  Seidman, supra note 98, at 907. “The problem with torture is … that the 
victim’s will is commandeered by the dehumanizing realization that all we associate with 
being human is an illusion [as regards mental freedom]. It is not the pain itself that is the 
essence of torture’s evil.  It is rather what the pain produces—the terrible betrayal of our 
self-understanding of human life.” Id. 
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common tactic.103  Similar tactics were pursued by British forces on the 
frontiers of the Empire, both before and after the Hague Conventions.104 
The Hague Conventions provided for the challenge of different enemies 
by presenting the Regulations as a “contract” among the parties, binding 
only in wars in which all sides were committed to the Regulations.  The 
catch-all provision in the Preamble left situations not covered by the rules 
“under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of 
nations . . . the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience”105 without defining any of these terms.  Since they were 
outside the “contract” among the Hague parties, they were left for each 
State to determine for itself. 
What if a State ratified the Regulations, but then allowed troops to 
violate the prohibitions?  The Hague Conventions were silent on the point, 
but the silence was taken as endorsement for the traditional remedy— 
“reprisals” in kind.106  The Lieber Code was more explicit: “The law of 
war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of 
nations, of which it is a branch.”  When facing “a reckless enemy,” the 
opposing side may “often” have “no other means of securing [itself] against 
the repetition of barbarous outrage.”107 
Here is where a different root of “proportionality” may be found.  The 
Lieber Code cautions: “Unjust and inconsiderate retaliation removes the 
belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war 
and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.”  
 
 103.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE U.S. ARMY AND THE INDIAN 
51 (1973) (noting that punitive raids were “aimed at finding and destroying Indian 
villages,” though in the “majority of actions, the army shot noncombatants incidentally 
and accidentally, not purposefully”).  
 104.  See C.E. CALLWELL, SMALL WARS: THEIR PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 40–42 
(1990, reprinting 1896 edition) (recommending “raids on livestock” to quell native 
rebellions outside Europe, or else “their villages must be demolished and their crops and 
granaries destroyed” and remembering that “the overawing and not the exasperation of the 
enemy is the end to keep in view.”). 
 105.  1899 Version, supra note 33, at preamble. Compared to the 1907 convention; 
the 1899 Preamble speaks, a shade less imperatively, of the “requirements [rather than 
‘dictates’] of the public conscience” and both precede this with a reference to “usages 
established between civilized nations” [emphasis added]—which might exclude wars with 
“uncivilized nations.” 
 106.  LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 305–06 (2d ed. 1912); 
see also id. at 308 (noting that “the Hague Regulations do not mention reprisals at all” 
because Russian proposals for limits on reprisals were rejected at an earlier international 
conference). 
 107.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art 27. 
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Consequently, the Code admonishes that “retaliation shall only be 
resorted to after careful enquiry into the real occurrence and the character 
of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.”108  It does not quite say that 
“retaliation” must be “proportionate” to the provocation.  European 
commentators (and proposals from European governments in the late 
Nineteenth Century) sought to clarify exactly that point.109  Down to the 
eve of the Geneva conference in the 1970s, articles on “proportionality” 
typically focused on the requirement that a “reprisal” should be roughly 
proportionate to the offense that triggered it—lest the rule be lost 
altogether.110 
“Proportionality” made sense to military lawyers in the context of 
reprisals.  Reprisals were understood as actions otherwise unlawful, except 
when necessary to force the enemy to stop the same practice.111  Reprisals 
were supposed to uphold the rule by forcing the enemy to face the 
consequences of violating it.  That did often work, as when execution of 
enemy prisoners prompted respect for prisoners held by the enemy.112 But 
without some caution, “reprisal” could generate counter-reprisals and end 
with both sides disregarding the rules. 
It made sense when there were relatively clear rules.  It made less sense 
when the rules were already vague—as with permissible targets in an 
ongoing military campaign. 
III.  HARSH MEASURES OF WAR:  CONTINUITY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
WAR TACTICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
If “proportionality” had long been an established part of the law of war 
—and understood as a major constraint—one would expect to find that 
earlier wars were far less destructive.  That is indeed how the Red Cross 
Commentary tells the history of war.  “Up to the First World War, there was 
little need for [treaty provisions to clarify] the practical implementation of 
this customary rule [exempting civilians and civilian objects] as the 
 
 108.  Id. at art. 28. 
 109.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 308–09 (summarizing limits endorsed by 
Institute of International Law, including “reprisals . . . must never exceed the degree of the 
violation committed by the enemy” and “must in every case respect the laws of humanity 
and of morality”). However, Oppenheim himself concedes “reprisals” are bound to be 
“terrible means, because they are in most cases directed against innocent enemy 
individuals, who must suffer for real or alleged offences for which they are not responsible. 
Id. at 305. 
 110.  See e.g., Robert W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 
66 AM. J. INT’L L. 586 (1972). 
 111.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 83–84. 
 112.  See id. at 306–08 (citing examples in which abuse of prisoners by an enemy 
was halted by threat to reciprocate). 
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population barely suffered from the use of weapons unless it was actually 
in the combat zone itself.”113 
The Red Cross account leaves out quite a bit of relevant history, even if 
one looks at conflicts among western states in the Victorian era.  Civilians 
in Paris were starved and subjected to relentless artillery bombardment by 
Prussian invaders in 1870.114 In the American Civil War, the Union army 
shelled the besieged river port of Vicksburg so relentlessly that civilians 
relocated (often with household furniture) to primitive bomb shelters.115  
Across the Confederacy, civilians  suffered from shortages of food and 
vital resources (including salt for curing meat) imposed by the Union’s 
naval blockade of southern ports116 and by the deliberate depredations of 
agricultural regions by General William T. Sherman and other Union 
commanders.  The Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, denounced 
General Sherman as “the Attila of the American Continent.”117 
Even the Red Cross Commentary does not pretend that the world wars 
were fought under strict rules of constraint to ensure protection of 
civilians.  The Commentary depicts the world wars as a sort of mindless 
descent to savagery, fueled by a spiral of retaliatory excesses on all sides.118  
The Commentary sees the Second World War as “a dramatic turning 
point” in the constraining effect of humanitarian law, at the climax of 
which “the belligerents went so far as to wage war almost indiscriminately, 
 
 113.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 598. 
 114.  On bombardment of Paris by Prussian army in 1870, see Robert Tombs, The 
Wars Against Paris, in ON THE ROAD TO TOTAL WAR 546–48 (Stig Forster and Jorg Nagler 
eds., 1997) (“Civilians were not being caught up in siege operations owing to the 
carelessness of the soldiers: They were the ultimate target of those operations, which had 
no other aim but to intimidate them into political surrender.”). 
 115.  WINSTON GROOM, VICKSBURG 1863, at 390 (2009).  For over six weeks, 
between 500 and 5,000 artillery shells landed in Vicksburg. Id.  Firing from naval gunboats 
on the Mississippi, west of Vicksburg “was deliberately aimed at the civilians” in the city, 
because military fortifications were out of range. Id. at 363.  “[M]ost shells” from Grant’s 
army, entrenched to the east of city, also landed on civilian houses, so civilians moved into 
cave dwellings, taking furniture, rugs and household valuables because “so many homes 
were smashed up by Federal bombardment that these furnishings most likely would have 
been ruined anyway.” Id. at 364.  Food was so scarce that civilians were reported to buy 
rats for meat. Id. at 403. 
 116.  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, WAR ON THE WATERS: THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE 
NAVIES, 1861–1865, at 183 (2012). 
 117.  JEFFERSON DAVIS, II RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 279 
(1881). 
 118.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 598. “By the repeated use of reprisals 
the point was reached were systematically directed at towns and their inhabitants.” Id. 
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which resulted in heavy losses among the civilian population and 
culminated in the dropping of the nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.”119 
It would be generous to describe the Red Cross’s narrative  as 
oversimplified.  It is a politically convenient fable—the world wars as seen 
from the safe perspective of Swiss lawyers.  Even harsher characterizations 
might be applied to the moral evasions in the Red Cross account.  Before 
reaching the moral disputes, however, it is worthwhile to look first at the 
actual historical record.  Long before the “dramatic turning point” of the 
Second World War, western military strategists assumed that military necessity 
authorized them to deploy tactics that imposed considerable loss on 
civilian populations.  Air attacks on cities were not the first time civilians 
were made to share in the costs of war. 
An instructive example occurred at the very outset of the Twentieth 
Century.  In 1899, the Dutch-speaking Boer republics in South Africa 
invaded the neighboring British colonies.  Within a year, the British army 
had repelled these incursions and taken possession of both Boer capitals.  
Then, a guerrilla campaign broke out in the open plains outside the Cape 
Colony.  British forces commanded by General Herbert Kitchener responded 
by devastating farms over a large region, then gathering women and 
children in bases which were called “concentration camps.”120  The term 
was pointedly embraced by German authorities in later times.  Thousands 
died—some twenty per cent of those “concentrated”—mostly from epidemic 
disease, attributed to poor sanitary conditions and inadequate provisions.121 
When word of these camps reached London, the Liberal Party (then in 
opposition) denounced the government’s handling of the policy—though 
not the underlying policy itself.122  The Conservative government removed 
the camps from military to civilian control, greatly alleviating conditions, 
but did not disavow the policy.  It was a severe and costly policy, but not 
motivated by vengeful passion or mere desire to terrorize.123  It did, in 
 
 119.  Id. at 586. 
 120.  For a detailed account of the war’s origins, see THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE BOER 
WAR 100–80 (1979). 
 121.  Id. at 549. 
 122.  See id. at 533–49.  Churchill wrote a book published in 1958, but completed 
some twenty years earlier, which also uses the term “concentration camp” and offers a 
sympathetic account of criticism from Liberal leaders at the time, regarding conditions in 
the camps, where thousands died from inadequate food and disease. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL. IV: THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES 383 
(1958).  
 123.  Pakenham reports that even some Boer leaders recognized the logic of the 
British policy.  “One is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under 
English protection,” wrote General Louis Botha near the end of the war. See PAKENHAM, 
supra note 120, at 603. 
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fact, secure the submission of the guerrillas. It did not even prevent former 
Boer fighters from accepting the post-war settlement.  Leading Boer 
commanders in the war were subsequently elected to high offices in South 
Africa, with Boer support, on a program of cooperation with the British 
Empire.124  Jan Smuts, a Boer commander in 1900, served in British war 
councils in both world wars.125   
What is most telling about this episode is that it was endorsed by leading 
scholars of international law at the time.  Lassa Oppenheim’s treatise, 
International Law, first appeared in 1906 and became the leading English 
language treatise for most the twentieth century.126  Oppenheim interpreted 
the devastation of farms as a response to “military necessity” and the 
“concentrating” of women and children as a “humanitarian” compensation.127  
Percy Bordwell, an American law professor, published a short treatise on 
the law of war in 1908.128  Bordwell also endorsed the devastation and 
“concentration camps” as reasonable acts of war.  American forces deployed 
similar tactics to defeat guerrillas in the Philippines at almost the same 
time.129 
 
 124.  Louis Botha represented the Boers at the peace conference following the Boer 
War.  After the Union of South Africa was reorganized as a Dominion of the British 
Empire, he served as Prime Minister from 1910 to 1919, in which capacity he assisted 
British war efforts in the First World War and signed the Versailles Treaty in 1919.  
 125.  See KENNETH INGHAM, JAN CHRISTIAN SUMTS 94–115, 208–33 (1986). As South 
African Minister of Defense in the First World War, Smuts took an active role in 
campaigns against German colonies in Africa and then served in the Imperial War Cabinet 
in London in the last years of the war and subsequently represented South Africa at post-
war peace conferences. See id. at 94–115.  As Minister of Defense and Prime Minister in 
the Second World War, Smuts again played an active role in British strategy councils and 
in plans for the postwar United Nations. See id. at 208–33. In 1941, Smuts was given the 
rank of British Field Marshall. See id.  
 126.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 190–91. 
 127.  “The practice resorted to, during the South African war, to house the victims of 
devastation in concentration camps, must be approved.  The purpose of war may even 
oblige a belligerent to confine a population forcibly in concentration camps.” Id. 
 128.  PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 153 (1908). 
“The Boers thought they were fighting for the sacred cause of liberty.  If they were willing 
to suffer martyrdom in that cause, all honor was due them, but when in order to continue 
the struggle they found it necessary to resort to guerrilla fighting, thus involving the whole 
people, they had no right to complain when the British authorities made prisoners of those 
who had ceased to be non-combatants.” Id.  Anyway, “[t]he sufferings of those who were 
not brought into the camps were worse than those who were brought in.” Id. (citing a 1902 
letter from Boer General Louis Botha).  Bordwell was professor of constitutional law at 
the University of Missouri. 
 129.  Bordwell made the comparison explicitly. See id. at 155. 
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Delegates to the Second Hague Peace Conference, held in 1907, did not 
seem to think these recent episodes demanded a new convention to 
regulate or restrain such severe war measures.130  Even after the Second 
World War, subsequent editions of Oppenheim’s treatise retained the passage 
on “concentration camps,” letting the terminology of a more innocent era 
speak for itself.131  The editors of post-war editions instead contrasted 
Britain’s policy in South Africa in 1901 with depredations of the German 
army in France in 1916, in Norway in 1940, and in Russia in 1943 as 
exercises in vengeance or fury, unrelated to immediate tactical exigencies.132  
Among other things, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal conferred 
jurisdiction (as Oppenheim’s post-war editors recorded) for the crime of 
“wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified 
by military necessity.”133 
To Oppenheim and his later editors—as to his forerunners like Lieber 
and Vattel—it seemed quite reasonable to distinguish even deliberate 
“devastation” from mere “wanton destruction.”  In the Boer War, Britain 
had faced a military challenge and dealt with it, making some effort to 
limit the worst consequences to civilians. Neither at the time, nor in later 
decades, did commentators try to justify harsh measures by depicting the 
Boers as beyond the claims of humanity.134 
In the world wars, Britain and its allies unleashed tactics that caused 
civilian suffering on a far wider scale.  In the First World War, British 
blockade measures provoked great bitterness in Germany, where the 
“starvation blockade” was seen as an attempt to terrorize civilians.135  
Whatever else one may say of this policy, it was not prompted by war 
 
 130.  See BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER 324–38 (1966) (describing political 
currents leading up to the Second Hague Peace Conference and preoccupying delegates; 
concern about tactics in colonial wars was not on the agenda). 
 131.   See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 415–16 (H. Lauterpacht, 
ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id.  (quoting International Military Tribunal Charter art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945) 
(emphasis added). Writing in the 1970s, a British historian concurred that “British anti-
guerrilla operations (including much devastation) in the second phase of the Boer war” 
had preserved “a proper distinction . . . between property and persons” as targets of attack. 
GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 354 (1980). 
 134.  The young Winston Churchill’s first speech in the House of Commons, as a 
new Conservative member in 1901, expressed sympathy for the Boers: “we cannot help 
admiring their determination and endurance” and “if I were a Boer, I hope I should be 
fighting in the field.” Still, he did not question the justice or wisdom of the war. RANDOLPH 
S. CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL VOL. II: YOUNG STATESMAN 7–9 (1967). 
 135.  See C. PAUL VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUNGER: THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF 
GERMANY 1915–1919, at 45–60, 124–51 (1985).  
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fever, let alone by technological compulsion.136  Four years before the 
outbreak of the world war, the Liberal government of the day had agreed 
to the Declaration of London, which proposed to limit seizures of enemy 
cargo on the high seas to war-related contraband and to limit blockades 
solely to ports receiving such supplies.137 
In the House of Lords, critics warned that enemies might treat food 
shipments as contraband and try to blockade all British ports.  It would be 
a natural recourse for an enemy, they argued, since an enemy was likely 
to think that food shortages would undermine the British public’s support 
for the war: “the pinch on our population would be terrible.  Therefore it 
is no wonder that a foreign power should make its plans almost exclusively 
at the beginning of a naval war with a view to creating a shortage in our 
food supply.”138  On the strength of such arguments, the Lords rejected 
the Declaration of London and it was not adopted.139 
In the ensuing war, it was Britain which blocked Germany’s food 
supplies.  The massive post-war study sponsored by the British government, 
History of the Blockade of Germany, was completed in 1937, but not made 
public for more than a quarter century.140  The study acknowledges that, 
from the evidence of German sources, the blockade did not prevent 
 
 136.  An alternate explanation offered in RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 
586 ("During the Second World War . . . the enormous development of the means of 
warfare jeopardized this principle [of civilian immunity] in practice"). 
 137.  Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1113–22. For background on diplomatic 
origins and subsequent political fate of the treaty, see CALVIN DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 303–26 (1975). 
 138.  EARL OF SELBORNE, DEBATES IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT 1911–1912 ON DECLARATION 
OF LONDON AND NAVAL PRIZE BILL 631 (1919).  He began by saying: “I think foreigners 
are largely inclined to overestimate the effect which such a pinch would have upon our 
population.  I believe our people, if the war was one in which their heart was engaged, 
would not hamper their Government by riot or panic at a time of such emergency.” Id.  
 139.  See DAVIS, supra note 137. 
 140.  ARCHIBALD C. BELL, A HISTORY OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, 1914–1918, 
at iv (1961).  As the preface (written in 1937) explains, the term “blockade” in the title is 
“conveniently employed as a general description of measures taken by this country to deal 
with enemy commerce during the Great War, but is technically inaccurate, as a legal 
blockade of the Central Powers, in the technical sense given to the word in international 
law, was never declared and the powers taken by Orders in Council to deal with trade of 
the Central Powers generally . . . were justified as reprisals for their infractions of 
international law.”  Id.  Blockade “in the technical” sense—at least in the Nineteenth 
Century—required close-in naval forces blocking access to specific ports, which was not 
how Britain organized its efforts to close off German access to sea-borne commercial 
traffic. 
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Germany from continuing to provide adequate munitions and equipment 
to its troops in the field.  Still, the author, Professor A.C. Bell, concluded 
that “the great consequence” of the blockade “and the great achievement 
of those who waged it” was the “infusing” of “a blind and contagious 
anger at authority” in “one of the bravest and most obedient  peoples in 
Europe.”141 
As the official history saw it, food shortages caused by the blockade 
undermined civilian morale and contributed to the mutiny in the fleet and 
the uprising in Berlin in November of 1918, which forced the Kaiser to 
abdicate and the German army to insist on an immediate armistice.  The 
official history offers no criticism of the blockade, even while accepting 
German claims that it led to hundreds of thousands of deaths (from the 
effects of epidemic disease on civilian populations weakened by food 
shortages and dietary deficiencies).142 
Decades later, Hersch Lauterpacht, successor to Oppenheim’s chair at 
Cambridge, defended the blockade as a logical extension of “economic 
warfare.”  The traditional law of contraband rested on “the notion of a 
legally relevant distinction between military and civilian needs.”143  The 
wartime blockades presumed “no such sacrosanctity attaches to the civilian 
population at large as to make illegal the effort to starve it alongside the 
military forces of the enemy as a means of inducing him to surrender.  
According to accepted practice in war on land, the civilian population in 
a beleaguered fortress enjoys no such immunity.”144  The blockade might 
be considered a larger version of a siege.145   
Certainly the blockade was not the product of a mere emotional impulse 
to avenge battle losses on the Western Front.  In 1929, after a decade of 
postwar peace, the British government was confronted with a diplomatic 
initiative from the new U.S. President, Herbert Hoover (who had distributed 
food to refugees during the war).  Hoover proposed a treaty stipulating 
 
 141.  Id. at 674. 
 142.  Id. at 671–73.  Bell reports, without challenge, statistical evidence compiled by 
German authorities, showing that civilian deaths were markedly higher during the last 
years of the war than in pre-war years.  There was much hardship in Germany in the last 
years of the war, owing to fuel shortages, loss (or feared loss) of relatives in the army, 
general anxiety about the future—and an influenza epidemic.  Isolating the precise effects 
of the blockade on larger statistical patterns must be a matter of conjecture. 
 143.  Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
365 (1952). 
 144.  Id. at 374. 
 145.  Id. (noting British war manual that authorized commanders, when conducting 
siege operations, to refuse to allow evacuations of civilians so as to hasten the surrender 
of the defending combatants).  He also notes that the U.S. Military Tribunal, in the German 
High Command Trial (War Crimes Trials, Vol. 12 at 84), accepted this defense of German 
policies in Russia in the Second World War.  Id. 
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that, in any future war, belligerent navies would not interfere with ordinary 
food shipments to their enemies.146  The British government, in the hands 
of the Labour party at that moment, declined.  A memo for the Cabinet’s 
Committee of Imperial Defence explained the reasons for rejection: 
Blockade in general and food blockade in particular are the greatest deterrent to 
war and are recognized as such by the adoption of economic pressure as a sanction in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations.  To remove or weaken the greatest 
deterrent is not to make war less probable.  To tell a potential enemy that in all 
circumstances you will feed him, is not to reduce the risk of an aggression.147 
In the Second World War, Britain again imposed severe blockade 
measures, almost from the outset.148  Neville Chamberlain defended the 
practice as analogous to siege.149  Churchill, soon after succeeding 
Chamberlain in the spring of 1940, was more emphatic, defending food 
blockade as a tactic of coercion but not vengeance.150 “There will always 
be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including—I say 
deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the 
 
 146.  See President Hoover, Address at the Ceremonies on the Eleventh Anniversary 
of Armistice Day Under the Auspices of the American Legion 377 (Nov. 11, 1929) 
(Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1929) (stating that “food ships should be made free of 
interference in times of war” to eliminate “one of the underling causes” of naval arms 
races). 
 147.  Memorandum from the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense to the 
Subcommittee on Belligerent Rights at Sea 389–408 (Dec. 23, 1929), reprinted in SEA 
POWER AND THE CONTROL OF TRADE 407 (Nicholas Tracy ed., 2005). 
 148.  But not quite; as in the First World War, the British government initially 
worried about the reaction of neutrals, especially—but not only—in the United States.  By 
June of 1940, there were few neutrals left in Europe to worry about.  See W.N. MEDLICOTT, 
THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE 46–47 (1952) (reporting criticism of blockade policies in 
Parliament in March 1940, for “economic appeasement”). 
 149.  See 351 PARL. DEB., House of Commons (1939) (noting that Prime Minister 
Chamberlain stated, “a naval blockade is in no way different from a land siege and no one 
has ever suggested that a besieging commander should allow free [food] rations to a 
besieged town”). 
 150.  Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speech to House of 
Commons: The Few (Aug. 20, 1940). “What would indeed be a matter of general 
complaint would be if we were to prolong the agony of all Europe by allowing food to 
come in to nourish the Nazis and all their war effort, or to allow food to go in to the 
subjugated peoples, which certainly would be pillaged by the Nazis.”  The speech also 
noted that Hitler had recently commended the plan of President Hoover to exempt food 
from blockades.  Churchill’s response: “we can and we will arrange in advance for the 
speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly 
cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom.”  
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shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, 
freedom and peace.”151 
IV.  BOMBING AND CIVILIANS:  BEFORE, DURING AND                                           
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
What was new in World War II was the bombing of cities—new, at 
least, on the scale on which it was ultimately pursued.  The Red Cross 
Commentary seems to have this tactic in mind when it depicts the eclipse 
of “the customary rule” as resulting from a cycle of mutual retaliation, 
which finally left new technologies of destruction to operate outside all 
control.152 
The kernel of truth in this account is that both Britain and Germany 
claimed that the other side had initiated the bombing of cities and both 
claimed, on this basis, the right to bomb enemy cities in reprisal.  Reprisals, 
however, were supposed to intimidate the opponent into abandoning a 
particular tactic.  Here, Britain launched into the bombing of Berlin as 
soon as the first German bombs fell on civilian areas in London, in August 
of 1940, without trying to test the German claim that the attack on London 
neighborhoods had been inadvertent.153  Both sides then continued the 
bombing of cities without any serious effort to seek a return to mutual 
restraint.154  In the spring of 1941, Germany finally abandoned attacks on 
British cities to concentrate its resources for its impending war against 
Soviet Russia.  Britain continued an ever more intense bombing campaign 
against German cities.155   
Britain’s bombing offensive was not launched on sudden impulse of 
fury and then sustained by blind rage.  Britain had established a separate 
air force in 1918—the first country in the world to do so—with the explicit 
aim of allowing the air arm, like the navy, to pursue its own strategy, 
 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 613–28. 
 153.  GEORGE QUESTER, DETERRENCE BEFORE HIROSHIMA 117 (1966) (“the bombs 
dropped [on London] on the 24th [of August] were not the all-out attack for which Britain 
had been braced since 1939, and a serious German assault on London, in the absence of 
provocation, could by no means be a certainty . . . most of London still stood untouched” 
when Churchill decided “to bomb Berlin”). 
 154.  See id. at 120–21 (noting that “while certain later German moves could possibly 
be interpreted as ‘feelers’ aimed at re-establishing restraints . . . September 1940 marked 
the end of British desires for such restraints”). 
 155.  See id. at 136–45 (emphasizing that “lulls” in bombing by Germans of Britain 
and British air force of Germany were motivated by independent tactical concerns, not 
correlated with actions by the other side). 
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independently of the army’s ground campaigns.156  Britain was preparing 
a great air offensive for the spring of 1919, when the Germans unexpectedly 
sued for peace in November of 1918.157  It was Britain that pioneered the 
design and construction of long-range bombers in the mid-1930s.158  It 
was Britain that embarked on a crash program to build thousands of long-
range bombers in the first years of the war.  Germany never built fleets of 
long-distance bombers.  Only one other country made preparations for 
long-range bombing efforts before the Second World War—the distant 
United States.159 
Two legacies of the First World War stimulated British thinking about 
bombing in the inter-war years. First, the vast scale of casualties on the 
Western Front reinforced a determination to find means of fighting that 
would avoid the carnage of trench warfare.  Second, the war left Britain 
with new colonies in the Middle East and doubts about whether it could 
afford the costs of extended military deployments in places like Iraq.  In 
December 1919, War Minister Winston Churchill—who was also in charge 
of the new Air Ministry—explained to the House of Commons:  “The first 
duty of the Royal Air Force is to garrison the British Empire.”160  Of the 
RAF’s twenty-five squadrons, nineteen were deployed to India and the 
Middle East and an RAF commander was made military governor of 
 
 156.  H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, BRITISH AIR POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS, 1918–1939, 
at 27–35 (1976) (Among leading voices advocating an independent air service to launch 
attacks on German interior were Winston Churchill and Jan Smuts, culminating in establishment 
of independent air service on April 1, 1918) 
 157.  See MORTON WILLIAM ROYSE, BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
OF WARFARE 184–86 (1928) (noting that the Allies planned “general widespread destruction” 
by bombing for spring 1919, with “a six fold increase in bombing operations”—which 
“only the [Nov. 1918] Armistice prevented [them] from carrying out”). 
 158.  J.M. SPAIGHT, BOMBING VINDICATED 10 (1944), available at http://www.jrbooks 
online.com/spaight.htm.  Plans for long-range bombers were well under way in 1936, with 
what became the Stirling Bomber, followed by the Halifax and Lancaster bombers—all of 
which would see service in the first years of the next war.  By contrast, Germany in the 
1930s “was thinking only in terms of short-range bombers and particularly of dive-bombers for 
employment with her powerful mechanized army.” Id. 
 159.  See RONALD SCHAFFER, WINGS OF JUDGMENT, AMERICAN BOMBING IN WORLD 
WAR II 28–29 (1985) (describing evolving doctrine at the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School 
in the mid-1930s, which envisioned massive attacks on the enemy’s war economy and 
development of B-17 bomber in 1935 to implement this strategy).  Planners assumed such 
attacks would “affect German civilians severely but indirectly.” Id. at 33. 
 160.  LAWRENCE JAMES, CHURCHILL AND EMPIRE 165 (2014). 
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Iraq.161  Air attacks did prove quite effective in suppressing local revolts 
in Iraq, in India and elsewhere in the 1920s and 1930s.162 
By the mid-1920s, the military strategist Basil Lidell Hart celebrated air 
attacks as an extension of the traditional “British way of war” and claimed 
that short attacks on native tribes were actually more “humane” than ground 
assaults, because they could strike at valued property (such as sheep herds 
and corrals) without much loss of life.163  Critics did worry that a strategy 
of “air control” might “involve the death by bombing of women and 
children.”164  However, the critics did not force any great rethinking within 
the RAF.  One who learned his trade in colonial air attacks was Arthur Harris, 
who became commander of Bomber Command in the Second World 
War.165  Winston Churchill remained alert to the potential of air attacks 
when he moved from the Air Ministry to the Colonial Office in 1921.166 
The strategic bombing practiced by Britain and the United States was 
vastly more destructive, of course, than the colonial air attacks of the inter-
war years.  In 1943, Britain’s Royal Air Force sent a thousand bombers 
against Cologne and then mounted another such raid on Hamburg, igniting 
fire storms that consumed the city centers.  With these attacks, the RAF 
was not seeking to destroy specific munitions factories.  As early as 1941, 
careful study of bombing results persuaded the RAF that bombers did not 
have the accuracy to hit specific targets, such as particular factories.  
Destroying whole neighborhoods, it was hoped, would disrupt production 
by forcing workers to relocate, as had happened in British cities.167  U.S. 
bombers, joining the campaign in strength by 1943, strove for greater accuracy 
in daylight raids, but in practice left a similar trail of devastation.168 
 
 161.  Id. at 166.  See also HYDE, supra note 156, at 120–27 (on pacification of northern 
Iraq by Air Officer Commanding John Salmond in early 1920s). 
 162.  JAMES, supra note 160, at 160.  
 163.  See BASIL LIDDEL HART, THE BRITISH WAY OF WAR 158–60 (1932) (claiming 
RAF attacks to quell colonial risings in Iraq were preceded by warnings and were targeted 
on particular villages so “air operations left no ‘legacy of hatred’ as had been alleged” by 
critics).  
 164.  JAMES, supra note 160, at 167. 
 165.  CHARLES MESSENGER, ‘BOMBER’ HARRIS AND THE STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE 
16 (1984) (describing Harris’ experience leading air force units in India and Iraq in 
aftermath of First World War). 
 166.  JAMES, supra note 160, at 160. 
 167.  Analysis of RAF raids in the fall of 1941 found (based on photographic 
evidence) that only 15 percent of aircraft bombed within five miles of their intended 
targets. RICHARD OVERY, THE BOMBERS AND THE BOMBED: ALLIED AIR WAR OVER 
EUROPE 1940–1945, at 69–70 (2013). On RAF readiness to strike worker housing as an 
alternative (along with early hopes of undermining German morale), see id. at 56–57. 
 168.  Id. at 204 (“American bombing, though intended to be directed at oil and 
transport targets, was often little distinguishable from area raiding.”). 
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Still, strategic bombing was not designed to torment civilians.  Churchill 
had doubted, during the First World War, that bombing of cities would 
have a decisive effect.169  He continued to express that view in memos to 
Royal Air Force commanders in the Second World War.170  That does not 
mean bombing was pursued out of sheer spite. 
First, the bombing campaign was quite costly to those who waged it.  
Britain’s Bomber Command lost some 50,000 fliers—nearly a quarter of 
all British combat losses in the Second World War and over 40 per cent 
of all those who flew with Bomber Command.171  Britain was still a 
democracy and such losses would have been very hard to sustain if 
commanders did not think (and insist in public) that these sacrifices were 
securing tangible military benefits.  By the last years of the war, American 
air units suffered comparable casualties as the British, but the United 
States, untouched at home by German bombers, can hardly have been 
actuated by emotional craving for revenge.172  Meanwhile, nearly fifteen 
per cent of American military production was devoted to building and 
equipping bombers173—a diversion of resources that could hardly have 
been approved if military planners did not believe bombing would prove 
militarily rewarding. 
A second point to notice is that bombing in Europe was not limited to 
targets in Germany.  A sizable proportion of casualties from Anglo-American 
bombing were in occupied countries—especially in France, Belgium, and 
 
 169.  1 CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE 
AGAINST GERMANY 1939–1945, at 47 (1961). Reacting to German zeppelin attacks on 
London in October 1917, Churchill, then Minister of Munitions, prepared a memo expressing 
doubt that “any terrorization of the civilian population which could be achieved would 
compel the government of a great nation to surrender.” Id. 
 170.  In September 1941, now Prime Minister, Churchill submitted a memo to Air 
Marshal Portal of the RAF: “It is very disputable whether bombing by itself will be a 
decisive factor in the present war . . . There is no doubt the British people have been 
stimulated and strengthened by the [German bombing] attacks made upon them so far.”  
Id. at 182. 
 171.  MARTIN VAN CREVALD, THE AGE OF AIR POWER 137 (2011). 
 172.  RAF Bomber Command reported 47,268 combat fatalities among bomber 
crews—representing a loss rate of 41% of the 135,000 men engaged in bombing missions, 
the highest loss rate of any service.  Total American losses from bombing in Europe: 
30,099.  OVERY, supra note 167, at 229. 
 173.  See KENNETH P. WERRELL, DEATH FROM THE HEAVENS: A HISTORY OF STRATEGIC 
BOMBING 127 (2009) (reporting estimates that the same resources could have equipped an 
additional 25 tank divisions). 
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the Netherlands.174  There was no reason at all to take satisfaction from 
killing civilians in the territory of former allies or neutrals.  There was, to 
the contrary, solid reason to fear antagonizing populations that might 
otherwise wish to help the Allied cause. Allied commanders still decided 
to strike targets in these countries, even with the known risk that nearby 
civilians would be injured.  In the early years of the war, British officials 
took the precaution of asking governments in exile for approval and 
inevitably received it.175  Later on, American commanders insisted on 
bombing targets in France in preparation for the Normandy invasion, 
despite pleas from Churchill to avoid levels of civilian casualties that would 
embitter the French.176 
A third point:  as destructive as it was to German cities, bombing was 
not aimed at killing civilians.  British authorities found that German attacks 
in the Battle of Britain (September 1940—May 1941) killed 43,000 
civilians, but destroyed over 1,000,000 homes.177  This experience encouraged 
the view that attacks on urban centers could be extremely disruptive to 
war production, even if bombers could not pinpoint specific factories.  
Workers would be “de-housed.”178  The enemy could adapt measures to 
protect civilians from the worst by, for example, evacuating women and 
children from cities, by providing underground shelter for those remaining, 
and by situating likely targets away from cities.  Germany did generally 
resort to such protective measures.179  Allied commanders did not give a 
 
 174.  OVERY, supra note 167, at 361. “France Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark absorbed almost 30 percent of bomb tonnage dropped by the American and 
British bomber forces . . . countries in eastern Europe and the Balkans absorbed another 
6.7 per cent . . . they cost at least 70,000–75,000 lives, most of them among peoples 
sympathetic to the Allied cause.” Id. Some 10,000 people died in the Netherlands as a 
result of bombing—90 per cent of them from Allied bombing.  Id. at 426. 
 175.  See 2 CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE 
AGAINST GERMANY 1939–1945, 462–63 (1961) (describing British practice in 1942: 
“Consent was obtained more easily than might have been expected and both information 
and encouragement to attack was supplied in most cases”). 
 176.  SCHAFFER, supra note 159, at 40–43.  American commanders bridled at “letting 
German propaganda decide which objectives to attack” when Germans placed “military 
objectives behind friendly civilians.” Id. at 40.  They concluded that “death and injury 
among friendly civilians were. . . analogous to casualties among the Allies’ own troops.” 
Id. 
 177.  VAN CREVALD, supra note 171, at 101. 
 178.  See OVERY, supra note 167, at 92 (noting that “damage done to a large working 
class area was expected to affect the output of numerous factories through absenteeism or 
death where an attack on a single factory target would affect only that one”). 
 179.  See id. at 311 (noting that the “civil defense structure . . . proved sufficiently 
flexible to continue . . . coping with consequences of [air] raids”), 317 (asserting that the 
German peoples’ “experience of being bombed . . . was balanced” by “redistributing 
Jewish apartments and furnishings, using [concentration] camp  and foreign labor to clean 
up debris”). 
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moment’s thought to pursuing urban refugees into their rural retreats or 
developing bombs that could not only destroy surface structures, but also 
reach people in underground shelters.180 
After the attack on Hamburg, Germany’s Armaments Minister, Albert 
Speer, warned that a few more attacks of that kind would completely 
paralyze German war industry.181  At the time, however, the Allies lacked 
the capacity to pursue more attacks on that scale against major cities.182  
Bombing priorities kept shifting.  Britain’s Ministry of Economic Warfare 
tried to suggest “economic bottlenecks” whose destruction would have a 
decisive effect.183 So, for example, many air crews were lost in efforts to 
destroy German production of ball-bearings—to no great effect, as 
replacements were imported from neutral Sweden.184  In the midst of war, 
it was very hard to judge whether specific raids or bombing priorities were 
or were not having substantial effects on German war industry.185 
The effectiveness of bombing was a major focus of post-war inquiry by 
Allied specialists.186  German commanders acknowledged that it was a 
considerable source of concern.187  It certainly diverted German resources 
 
 180.  See SCHAFFER, supra note 159, at 72–78 (noting that proposals for bombing of 
German small towns for political effect were advanced in early 1944 by Lowell Weicker, 
a U.S. Army Air Force intelligence officer—and dismissed at the outset by career air force 
officers.).  
 181.  After the July 1943 raid on Hamburg—causing “devastation” which “could be 
compared only with the effects of a major earthquake”—Speer reported to Hitler that “a 
series of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major cities, would bring German 
armament production to a total halt.” ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 284 (1970). 
 182.  On the difficulties in mounting large scale attacks on German cities in the face 
of improved German air defenses and limited Allied air strength, see OVERY, supra note 
167, at 148–70. 
 183.  See 1 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 169, at 466 (noting that, in 1942, the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare “was constantly engaged in trying to discover economic 
bottlenecks, the destruction of which would, they thought, exert a far more paralyzing 
effect on German industry than the indiscriminate damage by general area bombing”). 
 184.  OVERY, supra note 167, at 286–87. 
 185.  See 3 CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR 
OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY 1939–1945, at 290 (1961). (Explaining that “[o]ne of the 
major problems of the bombing offensive was the achievement of a strategic concentration 
or, in other words, the establishment of a main aim . . . This problem persisted throughout 
the war . . .”). 
 186.  SPEER, supra note 181, at 499. 
 187.  Speer reports that barely a week after the German surrender, the commander of 
the U.S. 8th Air Force, General F.L. Anderson, came to see him with a retinue that included 
the wartime economic administrator, J.K. Galbraith, the military strategist and diplomat, 
Paul Nitze, and others associated with the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and discussions 
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into large-scale efforts to relocate industry and build air defenses—all of 
which consumed manpower and resources that would otherwise have 
served direct military action.  The strategic air campaign was, in effect, a 
separate front in the war, which made land campaigns on other fronts 
much more effective than they would otherwise have been.188 
It is true that “strategic bombing” was sometimes justified as a way to 
undermine “enemy morale”—an aim that might seem to justify almost 
any sort of destruction as a contribution to victory.  When Churchill and 
Roosevelt met at Casablanca in early 1943, they agreed, among other 
things, on a “combined bomber offensive” which would aim at “undermining 
the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed 
resistance is fatally weakened.”189  Allied planners believed that the 
severity of the naval blockade had undermined civilian morale and so 
forced Germany’s surrender in 1918.190  However, even the Casablanca 
directive did not depict “civilian morale” as an isolated objective, stressing 
instead the “progressive destruction and dislocation of the German 
military, industrial and economic system.”191  American air commanders, 
urging targeted attacks on crucial strategic infrastructure (such as 
transportation links), saw the Casablanca directive as an endorsement of 
their own approach.192  A year later, they resisted proposals from 
psychological warfare experts to bomb every small town in Germany 
simply to undermine German civilian morale.193 
Not even British air commanders, however, thought bombing cities 
would force German surrender until the military balance on the ground 
 
were so “comradely” that Speer regarded their exchanges as a “university of bombing.” 
Id. 
 188.  Most of German aircraft production during the war had to focus on fighter 
planes to counter the bombers and most of its planes had to remain at home, to counter 
Allied attacks, allowing the Red Army to maintain air supremacy on its own fronts by 
1943 and a similar advantage for Allied operations in the Mediterranean. OVERY, supra 
note 167, at 226.  Some 900,000 people in Germany were diverted into the antiaircraft 
service by 1944 and another 900,000 into civil defense operations; though “few of those 
involved would have been potential soldiers” (because they were too old or too young), 
they might have been used in other forms of war service. “The military consequences of 
the bombing were clearly more important than the economic, psychological, or political 
ones.”  Id. at 227–28. 
 189.  See 5 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 519–20 (1951) for text 
of this “Casablanca directive” of Feb. 4, 1943. 
 190.  HART, supra note 163, at 38. 
 191.  CHURCHILL, supra note 189. 
 192.  SCHAFFER, supra note 159, at 38. 
 193.  Id. at 72–79. 
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had shifted so decisively that Germans could nurture no hope of victory.194  
In the last months of the war, British commanders did revert to massive 
bombing of German cities in the hopes of hastening Germany’s surrender, 
often with participation of American bombers.  Critics have claimed these 
attacks did not force German surrender, so they were gratuitous.  Even if 
bombing did not hasten Germany’s surrender, that was not an implausible 
hope.  And the attacks did, at least, effect sufficient demoralization that 
Germans made no effort at guerrilla resistance after the surrender of their 
organized forces195—a prospect that Allied commanders had feared 
beforehand.196 
The claim that bombing of cities proved “ineffective” must also reckon 
with the fact that Japan surrendered before a single Allied soldier had 
landed on its home islands—but after years of tightening sea blockade and 
months of devastating air attacks, culminating in the dropping of two 
atomic bombs.  Those who defend the use of atomic weapons against 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki argue that this terrible tactic saved lives, since a 
full scale invasion would have been far more costly, even to the 
Japanese.197   
Still, the resort to atomic bombs required only a bit more ruthlessness 
than the strategy already practiced.  Twice as many civilians died in 
earlier, conventional air attacks on Tokyo and other cities as in the 
culminating nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.198  Truman 
 
 194.  1 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 169, at 10. “The theory of victory 
through air power alone never gained currency in the high strategic counsels of the Chiefs 
of Staff during the period of the Second World War.” Id.  
 195.  Lothar Kettenacker, The German Debate, in TERROR FROM THE SKY: THE 
BOMBING OF GERMAN CITIES IN WORLD WAR II 214, 218 (Igor Primoratz ed., 2010) “After 
May 1945, the much propagated Volksgemeinschaft [national community] had been 
immobilized overnight and transformed into an atomized society of individuals craving to 
hold on to life” so “morale bombing. . . did make a most important contribution to the 
long-lasting reorientation of the German nation.” Id.  
 196.  Allied concerns about the threat of German guerrilla resistance—“werewolves” 
—were not borne out by experience. MAX HASTINGS, ARMAGEDDON: THE BATTLE FOR 
GERMANY, 1944–1945, at 360, 499 (2004). 
 197.  Henry Stimson, Least Abhorrent Choice, TIME, Feb. 3, 1947.  A review of 
debates among historians emphasizes that even critics argue that Japan’s surrender could 
have been secured at approximately the same time without the use of atomic bombs—
thereby implicitly acknowledging the central question as one of military necessity.  See J. 
Samuel Walker, Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision, 29 DIP. HIST. 311, 
312 (2005).  
 198.  The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey estimated fatalities from air attacks on 
Tokyo and other cities (exclusive of atomic attacks at the very end) at 220,000.  See United 
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acknowledged no policy change, describing the first use of the atomic 
bomb as directed at “Hiroshima, a military target.”199  What is fair to say 
is that the earlier fire-bombing of Japanese cities had not been narrowly 
focused on military objectives, but had never been acknowledged as sheer 
terror raids against civilians.200 
Finally, if Allied bombing has come to be viewed in recent decades as 
another sort of “war crime,” that reflects retrospective views—some of 
which were stirred by effective propaganda.  During the war, German 
propaganda depicted Allied bombing as a “terror campaign,” conducted 
by “vandals” and “barbarians.”201 That view was generally rejected in Allied 
countries.  While a few churchmen raised questions about the morality of 
bombing cities, the “large majority” of Anglican and Catholic bishops in 
Britain denied that the RAF was engaged in “atrocities.”202  According to 
a recent study by a German scholar, religious publications in Britain at the 
time defended Allied bombing without ever expressing “military 
triumphalism or the aggressive rhetoric of war.”203  In America, The New 
York Times defended the fire-bombing of Hamburg in 1943, with an editorial 
rejecting German claims that the aim was simply to spread “terror.”204  
The Times defended the bombing of Dresden in similar terms in February 
1945.205 
 
States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, Pacific War, 20 (July 1, 1946), 
www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#thamotjc.  The same report estimated immediate deaths from the 
attack on Hiroshima at 70,000 (of whom 30,000 were military personnel) and 40,000 at 
Nagasaki. Id. at 23–24. 
 199.  Truman’s first public comment  in a prepared statement released to the press in 
written form, stressed the analogy with strategic bombing of military targets: “We are now 
prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the 
Japanese have above ground in any city.  We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and 
their communications.  Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power 
to make war.” 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 422 (1955).  However improbable it may 
sound, Truman had told the Secretary of War that he wanted the atomic bombs used so 
that “military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.” 
SCHAFFER, supra note 159, at 174. 
 200.  See SCHAFFER, supra note 159, at 151 (noting that Gen. Curtis LeMay insisted 
even incendiary attacks on Tokyo did not aim “to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations. 
No point in slaughtering civilians for the sake of slaughter”). 
 201.  OVERY, supra note 167, at 310. German “propaganda had always described 
Allied bombing as ‘terror bombing’ and the air crew as gangsters or air pirates.” Id.  
 202.  DIETMAR SUESS, DEATH FROM THE SKIES: HOW BRITONS AND GERMANS SURVIVED 
BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II 244 (2014). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Douglas Lackey, The Bombing Campaign: the USAAF, in TERROR FROM THE 
SKY: THE BOMBING OF GERMAN CITIES IN WORLD WAR II 55–57 (Igor Primoratz ed., 2010). 
Lackey concludes that, from the fact that some criticism from church leaders “fizzled out” 
by 1944, “the mass killings of German citizens in air attacks were implicitly endorsed by 
a large majority of the American people.”  Id. at 57. 
 205.  Id. 
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In later years, Dresden came to be viewed quite differently, largely 
owing to the influence of a book published in 1963.  It asserted that “at 
least 150,000 civilians” had died as a result of Allied air attacks on that 
one city at a time when the Allies were already on the verge of complete 
victory.206  That account led the centrist German newspaper Die Zeit to 
call the Dresden bombing “probably the largest mass murder in the whole 
of human history.”207  However, the book turned out to be highly misleading.  
The author, David Irving, subsequently served a prison term in Austria for 
violating its law against Holocaust denial.208  His figures were taken from 
assertions by Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels in the immediate 
aftermath of the Dresden attacks.209  In 2004, the city of Dresden 
commissioned a panel of historians to establish the actual scale of civilian 
losses.  They reported that the number of fatalities was somewhere between 
18,000 and 25,000.210 
In recent years, serious historians have acknowledged that the Dresden 
attacks were not unreasonable in the context of military operations at the 
time.211  One of these is British historian Geoffrey Best, whose 1980 
history of humanitarian law was respectfully cited by the Red Cross 
Commentary.212  In a 2004 study of Churchill’s war leadership, Best defended 
the attack on Dresden as a reasonable application of a reasonable policy, 
aiming at the destruction of legitimate military targets in the path of the 
Red Army’s still fiercely resisted invasion of eastern Germany.213 
 
 206.  DAVID IRVING, THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN 210 (1963). It was the primary 
source for Kurt Vonnegut’s 1969 best-selling novel, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE, which was 
subsequently made into a successful film.  Ten days after the attack on Dresden, the RAF 
bombed Pforzheim, killing nearly as many people, but a far higher proportion of the 
population—some one in four residents, compared with 1 in 20 at Dresden—making it in 
percentage terms “the most lethal attack of the war.” FREDERICK TAYLOR, DRESDEN 373–
74 (2004).  The Pforzheim raid remains little known, however, because it was not the 
subject of polemical histories, fancifiul novels, popular films. Taylor concludes that the 
“long-lasting international outrage that followed the Dresden bombing represents, at least 
in part, Goebbels’s final, dark masterpiece.” Id. at 372.  
 207.  SUESS, supra note 202, at 502. 
 208.  Ian Traynor, Irving Jailed for Denying Holocaust, THE GUARDIAN, Feb 21, 2006, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/20/austria.thefarright. 
 209.  OVERY, supra note 167, at 214. 
 210.  SUESS, supra note 202, at 521. 
 211.  For the most recent study, emphasizing the military value of the attack on 
Dresden, see TAYLOR, supra note 206, at 148–63. 
 212.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 586.    
 213.  See GEOFFREY BEST, CHURCHILL AND WAR 280–84 (2005) (commenting that 
“Dresden, far from being the non-industrial city of pacifist and humanitarian belief (following 
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In the years immediately following the Second World War, there was 
not much disposition to question strategic bombing.  One indication is 
that, in the new war that broke out in Korea in 1950, American commanders 
quickly reverted to bombing cities.  By November of 1950, General 
MacArthur’s air force chief announced that “military targets” could extend 
to “every installation, facility and village in North Korea.”214  The policy 
was implemented with “incendiary raids against urban areas reminiscent 
of World War II.”215  “Proportionality and precision were at a discount; 
opportunities for destruction always seemed to be taken to maximal 
extent.”216  The fact that American commanders were acting for a broad 
international coalition, under the authorization of the UN Security 
Council, does not seem to have imposed any constraint at all on bombing. 
American bombing in the Vietnam War was more restrained.  President 
Johnson prohibited attacks on dams and dikes and other proposed targets 
whose destruction might lead to large-scale civilian casualties.  Still, when 
President Nixon authorized direct bombing of Hanoi in December of 
1972, the attacks were denounced as “area bombing” akin to “Dresden.”217  
This bombing venture caused 1,318 civilian deaths—less than a tenth of 
those who died in Dresden.  But there was more sensitivity to civilian 
casualties by then.218   
In contrast to the war in Korea, Americans were fighting almost alone 
in Vietnam.  American efforts provoked shrill condemnation not only from 
communist countries, but also from critics in Western Europe.   The Red 
Cross began preparations for a new international convention (what became 
AP–I) just as the United States was withdrawing from its long, unhappy 
involvement in Vietnam. 
However, a look at the longer background to that treaty does not confirm 
that it worked a systematic repudiation of Anglo-American military tactics, 
even in regard to bombing. 
 
Goebbels’ propaganda) was in fact of even more industrial importance than British 
intelligence knew” and the destruction of “bridges and railways” achieved “stoppage of 
traffic through the city . . . with which the Russians were delighted” in the midst of their 
offensive toward central Germany.). 
 214.  SAHR CONWAY-LANZ, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICANS, NON-COMBATANT 
IMMUNITY AND ATROCITY AFTER WORLD WAR II 105 (2006). 
 215.  Id. at 103. 
 216.  BEST, supra note 11, at 351. 
 217.  CONRAD CRANE, BOMBS, CITIES AND CIVILIANS 153 (1999). 
 218.  Id.  For robust defense of the Nixon administration’s “Christmas bombing” of 
North Vietnam, see W. Hays Parks, Linebacker and the Law of War, AIR UNIV. REV. (Jan.–
Feb. 1983).  The author, a military lawyer, argued that earlier U.S. bombing of North 
Vietnam (under the Johnson administration) had been less effective because it was hobbled 
by “too much attention to the potential for collateral damage.” W. Hays Parks, Rolling 
Thunder and the Law of War, AIR UNIV. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 1982). 
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V.  EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:   NO U-TURNS                       
ON THE PATH TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
Additional Protocol I (“AP–I”) clearly did repudiate some tactics pursued 
by the western Allies in the world war.  Most notably, it prohibited 
deliberate efforts to starve civilians219—which might seem to cast doubt 
on the legality of the efforts to include foodstuffs in the wartime blockades.220  
AP–I also prohibited “area bombing”—treating an entire locality as an 
undifferentiated military target.221  That might seem to cast a retroactive 
judgment on the actual pattern of Allied bombing in the Second World 
War. 
The Red Cross Commentary tries to present these prohibitions not as 
tightening of the rules, but as particular applications of an encompassing 
principle – that harm to civilians and civilian objects must always be quite 
minimal, because anything more than that would be “excessive.”222  The 
Commentary argues that this more general principle was the traditional 
rule, which happened to be temporarily overwhelmed in the Twentieth 
Century, under the stress of the world wars.223 
The preceding section should confirm that Allied commanders in the 
world wars did not adopt more severe tactics in a fit of absent-mindedness 
or in the grip of mindless rage.  After the Second World War, Air Marshal 
Arthur Harris, who commanded Britain’s strategic bombing offensive, 
insisted that RAF targeting had been entirely consistent with existing 
international law.224  Distinguished commentators such as Hersch Lauterpacht 
 
 219.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 54. 
 220.  See ELMAR RAUCH, PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND 
THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: REPERCUSSIONS ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
WARFARE 93–94 (1984) (acknowledging that the application of article 54 to naval blockades is 
disputable, since a number of delegates at Geneva insisted this provision did not change 
the existing law of naval warfare and an early commentary expressed doubt on the 
question). 
 221.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 51, ¶ 5(a).  
 222.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 626. 
 223.  Id. at 585–89.  
 224.  See ARTHUR HARRIS, BOMBER OFFENSIVE 177 (1947) (Contending that 
“international law can always be argued pro and con, but in this matter of the use of aircraft 
in war, there is, it so happens, no international law at all.”).  As Best soundly comments, 
Harris “would not have gone too far if he had restricted himself to saying that there was 
not much [international law on this subject] and that what there was lay mostly in the realm 
of principles, to whose practical application in circumstances of desperate total war against 
an exceptionally nasty enemy there was bound to be much controversy . . .” BEST, supra 
note 11, at 200. 
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(subsequently a judge on the International Court of Justice) also defended 
the bombing of cities as consistent with international law.225  Such conclusions 
might seem self-serving.  If one looks at the diplomatic history, however, 
both before and after the Second World War, the actual path from The 
Hague Conventions to Additional Protocol I offers considerable support 
for such defenses of Allied war measures. 
During the First World War, Allied leaders denounced the “barbarism” 
of German military measures—unannounced submarine strikes against 
civilian passenger ships, seizing and then murdering of hostages in occupied 
territories, wanton destruction of villages behind the front lines.226  Allied 
commentators pointed accusing fingers at German military manuals which 
openly advocated “terrorism” as a method of war.227  Allied commentators 
interpreted zeppelin attacks on London—dropping bombs from balloons 
—as attempts to “terrorize” the civilian population.228 
The Versailles Peace treaty offered one response:  Germany was forbidden 
to maintain an air force.229  Even with that safeguard in place, however, 
the victors still concerned to clarify, among themselves, how air power 
should or should not be used in future wars.  With the encouragement of 
Western governments, legal experts gathered at the Hague in the winter of 
1922–23 to formulate a new treaty.  Neither Germany nor Soviet Russia was 
represented at this conference.230   
 
 225.  Lauterpacht, supra note 143, at 365. 
 226.  See, e.g., J.H. MORGAN, GERMAN ATROCITIES, AN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION 90–
91 (1916) (noting that when British soldiers “drove the enemy out” from towns in Belgium 
and France, they found Germans had imposed a “reign of terror” sustained by “brutal and 
licentious fury”); JACQUES DAMPIERRE, GERMAN IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
200 (1917) (translation of French original) (remarking that “terrorism is the normal 
consequence of German imperialism”); JAMES W. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
WORLD WAR 328 (1920) (arguing that “doctrines of German militarists” justify “violence, 
ruthlessness, terrorism” even “against the civilian population” as “legitimate measures”). 
 227.  See, e.g., WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 89 (J.H. Morgan, ed. and 
trans., 1915) (citing 1902 German military manual’s admonition to “resort to terrorism” 
to quell civilian resistance to German military occupation); James W. Garner, The German 
War Code, 15 U. ILL. BULL. 9, 11, 16, 21, 26–27 (1918) (contrasting brutalities sanctioned by 
German military manuals with restraints upheld in British, French and U.S. counterparts); 
James Edmund Traube, Law of the Sea and the Great War, 7 A.B.A.  J.  33, 35 (Jan. 1921) 
(asserting that Germany “deliberately discarded all rules of international law built up for 
centuries by really civilized nations . . . and voluntarily returned to the methods of 
savagery . . . its motto being that not only must the armies of its foe in the field be 
overcome but the morale of the civil population destroyed by terrorism.”). 
 228.  Hide Zeppelin Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915; Elbridge Colby, Laws of 
Aerial Warfare 10 MINN. L. REV. 123, 134 (1925). 
 229.  Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, Art. 198 (“The armed forces of Germany 
must not include any military or naval air forces.”). 
 230.  LEE KENNETT, HISTORY OF STRATEGIC BOMBING 63–67 (1982) (British military 
authorities embraced the principle of confining air attacks to “military objectives” but 
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The fact that such a conference was convened at all is revealing:  it 
shows that Western powers did not regard pre-war Hague conventions as 
adequate to govern modern air war. It is even more revealing that this 
post-war effort failed to deliver an acceptable treaty text.  No ratified 
treaty set out standards for air attacks in the decades before the Second 
World War, nor for three decades thereafter.  AP–I was the first widely 
ratified treaty to codify limits on air attacks.231 
The various diplomatic initiatives in the interim period are still 
revealing about expectations of air war before the Second World War. The 
proposals from this period suggest a much greater degree of latitude or 
ambiguity in earlier understandings, compared with the simple formulas 
propounded in the Red Cross Commentary.  Governments recognized that 
new technology raised some new challenges, but major powers were not 
prepared to commit to precise rules for resolving them. 
Before the First World War, it had been common practice for an 
invading army to use artillery against a city held by the defending side.232  
The Hague Conventions accepted this tactic, only prohibiting bombardment 
of “undefended cities.”233  Against an undefended city, the invading force 
could simply march in and seize control.  Bombarding such a place 
seemed like gratuitous violence.  With the advent of aviation, however, it 
became possible to drop bombs on cities that were hundreds of miles from 
the front line.  If the defending army could stop invaders from reaching 
such interior cities, these cities could not be described as “undefended.”  
In contrast to a city on the front lines, however, an inland city could not 
be induced to surrender by aerial bombardment.  Could an entire nation 
be forced to surrender because bombs had been dropped on interior cities?  
Or was that strategy an invitation to pointless destruction? 
The legal experts gathered at The Hague in 1922–23 sought to cut off 
such temptations with a blanket prohibition on “air bombardment for the 
 
expressed “skepticism” that Hague rules could generate reliable consensus on proper 
definition of “military objectives”) 
 231.  For a detailed analysis of inconclusive debates in the inter-war era on possible 
applications of earlier Hague conventions to the new challenges of bombardment from 
modern aircraft, see Parks, supra note 15. 
 232.  See accounts of shelling against Vicksburg in 1863 and Paris in 1870, supra 
notes 114–15. 
 233.  1907 Version, supra note 32, at art. 25. 
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purpose of terrorizing the civilian population ….”234  To avoid making the 
prohibition turn on the meaning of “terrorizing,” the same provision also 
covered bombardment “for the purpose of . . . destroying or damaging 
private property not of military character or of injuring non-combatants.”235  
The proposed Rules on Air Warfare then distinguished permissible categories 
of “bombardment” not in reference to status (i.e., “defended” or not), but 
location.  It would be “legitimate” to conduct “bombardment of cities, towns, 
villages, dwellings and buildings” when they were situated in “the immediate 
neighborhood of the operations of land forces.”236  At greater distances, 
“aerial bombardment” must be “directed exclusively” at permissible “objectives” 
—including “military forces,” military supply “depots,”  “factories” making 
“military supplies,” “lines of communication or transportation used for 
military purposes.”237 
The proposed rules also offered differentiated cautions.  In the first 
category (direct attack on cities and towns) attackers were admonished to 
show “regard to the danger caused to the civilian population,” with the 
suggestion that this danger be weighed differently if the “military 
concentration” in the city or town were “sufficiently important.”238  In 
the latter category (“military objectives” at a distance), the proposed rules 
 
 234.  Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air 
Warfare, Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, art. 22 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 
Hague Rules], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 319. 
 235.  Id.  If the prohibition on “destroying or damaging private property” is 
understood as a separate prohibition from “terrorizing,” that would indicate a narrow 
understanding of “terrorizing”—and the narrower understanding might be the prohibition 
that survived the collapse of this effort in the 1920s.  
 236.  Id. at art. 24, ¶ 4. 
 237.  Id. at art. 24, ¶ 3. The wording here is somewhat confusing, as it begins by 
seeming to impose a total prohibition: “The bombardment of cities, towns, villages . . . not 
in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited.”  But, it then 
immediately offers a further restriction: “In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 
[“military establishments or depots . . . factories . . . lines of communication” etc] are so 
situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the 
civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment”—a restriction that would 
make no sense if the previous sentence were meant to impose an absolute prohibition 
against bombing of “cities . . . not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land 
forces.”  Since the following paragraph (4) does authorize “bombardment of cities,” paragraph 
3 seems intended to indicate that bombing of “cities” outside the “neighborhood” of land 
combat is not entirely prohibited, but must be restricted to specific military targets.  This 
reading was assumed by commentators at the time.  See James W. Garner, Proposed Rules 
for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 72 (1924) (commenting that 
“While [the Hague rule] prohibits the bombardment of the town or city [outside the 
“neighborhood” of military “operations”] it allows the bombardment of the “military 
objective” itself” even if located in that place). 
 238.  Id. at art. 24, ¶ 4. 
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cautioned attackers to avoid “indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian 
population.”239 
These formulations were subject to differing interpretations.  Both in 
Britain and America, commentators on the law of war endorsed the 
general logic of the proposals.  J.M. Spaight, a specialist on the law of war 
then serving in Britain’s Air Ministry, published a full-length treatise on 
Air Power and War Rights in 1924.240  He argued that attempts to 
undermine civilian morale by bombing might tempt belligerents to unlimited 
atrocities against enemy civilians.241  Still, Spaight gave forthright support 
to the use of air power “to deprive the enemy’s forces of supplies and 
shelter”—the air equivalent, as he saw it, to “Sherman’s devastations” in 
Georgia during the American Civil War, “and Kitchener’s devastation of 
the Boer Republics in 1901–02.”242  The actual practice of the Second 
World War did not shake his opinion.  In 1944, he published Bombing 
Vindicated243 and a few years later published a revised edition of Air 
Power and War Rights,244 both of which defended the bombing of German 
cities as entirely lawful and proper. 
American commentators in the 1920s also endorsed the general 
formulas in the Hague Air Rules, seeing them as compatible with vigorous 
bombing from the air.245  A full-length study published by a Harvard 
 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS (1924). In his earlier work, WAR 
RIGHTS ON LAND, Spaight justified General Kitchener’s “devastation” of Boer farmland as 
following the precedent of General Sherman’s marches through Georgia and the Carolinas 
in the American Civil War—and defended them as proper. J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON 
LAND 308–10 (1911).  Spaight attended the Hague conference of jurists in 1922–23 and 
dedicated AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS to John Bassett Moore, the chief American 
delegate to that conference.  
 241.  SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 8–22. 
 242.  Id. at 242. 
 243.  See SPAIGHT, BOMBING VINDICATED, supra note 158. Chapter 1 is entitled, “The 
Bomber Saves Civilisation,” Spaight argues that all of Hitler’s “frantic bellowing and . . . 
blather” against British air attacks were stirred by the dictator’s awareness “that, in the 
end, our air offensive, if it did not win the war for us, would certainly prevent Germany 
from winning it.” Id. at 12. 
 244.  See J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 261–62 (3d ed., 1947) (commenting 
that the “war industry” in Germany had come to be “concentrated more and more in the 
cities, so only by closing “one’s eyes to the facts” could one believe “there are no bad 
cities, that they are all good little cities and must be tenderly treated.”). 
 245.  See Paul Whitcomb Williams, Legitimate Targeting in Aerial Bombardment, 23 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 570 (1929). Hague Air Rules, prohibiting “bombing of military 
objectives . . . if [that] requires indiscriminate bombardment of civilian population,” 
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scholar in the 1920s concluded that nations at war were not likely to 
observe serious restraints on their use of air attacks—apart from measures 
which aroused so much shock, they might be viewed as equivalent to 
medieval torture.246 
By then the British government had already declined to commit, even 
to the rather elastic standards in the 1923 Hague Air Rules, from fear of  
entanglement in disputes about what would constitute a “legitimate” “military 
objective.”247  When Britain abandoned the 1923 Hague Rules, other 
powers lost interest.248  There were no further efforts to negotiate restraints 
on air power until the late 1930s, when war again seemed a likely possibility. 
In 1938, the International Jurists Association (“IJA”) proposed a new 
set of standards.  This proposal again prohibited bombing “for the purpose 
of terrorizing the civilian population.”249  It still tried to limit air attacks 
to targets of military relevance.250  It still condemned air attacks even on 
 
would encourage “each belligerent to locate his important military factories beneath the 
shelter provided by this provision,” but it is “inconceivable that nations which have come 
to regard the air services as a major means of attack will forego the advantages derived 
from [air power] . . . [so] ultimately any such prohibition must be disregarded.” Id. at 577. 
Williams specifically approves bombing to kill workers in munitions factories, because “it 
is no longer possible to distinguish at all times . . . the men at the front and the workers in 
factories.” Id. at 580.  Similarly Colby, Aerial Law and War Targets, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 
702 (1925), endorsed “the doctrine set forth by Mr. Spaight.” Elbridge Colby Aerial Law 
and War Targets, 19 AM. J. INT’L. L. 702, 708 (1925). He also argued that when the 
“objective” has “military importance,” demands to limit harm to civilians in attacking it 
“would be ‘the pound of flesh’ which the air commander must take without drawing 
civilian blood.” Id. at 710. 
 246.  See ROYSE, supra note 157, at 240–41 (commenting that “[n]ations will employ 
an effective weapon to its utmost extent checked only by social sanction as manifested in 
the accepted minimum standards of the time.  Skinning prisoners alive or breaking them 
on the wheel is no longer countenanced in western warfare.  It is, however, questionable 
whether devastation in war as a means of moral pressure falls below the accepted 
minimum standards today.”). 
 247.  British service chiefs disputed among themselves how to interpret the 1923 
Hague rules.  Hugh Trenchard, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, argued that while it was 
proper to prohibit indiscriminate air attacks on the civilian population, it was an “entirely 
different matter to terrorise munitions workers (men and women) into absenting 
themselves from work or stevedores into abandoning the loading of a ship with munitions 
through fear of air attack upon the factory or dock concerned.” 4 CHARLES WEBSTER & 
NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY 1939–1945 71–83 
(1961).  A more focused account concludes: “The crux of the problem was the difficulty 
in defining and reaching agreement on what constituted a military objective.”  Uri Bialer, 
Humanization of Air Warfare in British Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Second World 
War, J. CONTEMP. HIST. 79, 93 n.8 (1978). 
 248.  QUESTER, supra note 153, at 78. 
 249.  Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New 
Engines of War, International Jurists Association, art. 4 (1938) reprinted in THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 332. 
 250.  Id. at art. 5. 
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such military “objectives” when “so situated” that they could only be 
reached through “indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population.”251  
But instead of distinguishing attacks in the “vicinity” of land forces from 
attacks on more distant places, the IJA proposal sought to ban all attacks 
on places without “belligerent establishments,” while defining the latter 
to include “factories” and “aerodromes.”252 
The drafters evidently had so little confidence in the actual implications 
of these restrictions—in terms of preventing harm to civilians—that they 
also included an elaborate scheme for “safety zones” which would “enjoy 
immunity from attack or bombardment”253 so long as they contained only 
persons over age sixty and under age fifteen and “such other persons (not 
exceeding in the aggregate five per cent)” of the zone’s population to take 
care of the young and the elderly.254  Only by expelling almost all persons 
of potential military relevance could a town claim complete immunity 
from attack. 
A month later, the League of Nations, instead of endorsing the detailed 
formulas of the IJA proposal, simply adopted a resolution condemning 
“intentional bombing of civilians,” attacks on other than “legitimate” and 
“identifiable” “military objectives,” and attacks which affected “civilian 
populations” through “negligence.”255  In 1938, the British government 
did not resist the League resolution setting forth these standards.  It was 
not a treaty, its status in international law was ambiguous,256 and it largely 
summarized a then-recent statement by the British Prime Minister.257 
That statement, however, was made by Neville Chamberlain in 
peacetime.  When Winston Churchill became prime minister in the midst 
of a full-scale war, he gave a freer reign to Britain’s bombers.  It can 
certainly be argued that the actual practice of strategic bombing in the 
Second World War—with firebombing of heavily populated cities in 
Germany and Japan—did go much beyond the limits of acceptable “aerial 
 
 251.  Id. at art. 4, ¶ 2. 
 252.  Id. at art. 2. 
 253.  Id. at art. 10. 
 254.  Id. at art. 12. 
 255.  Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing from the Air in Case of 
War, Resolution of the League of Nations Assembly (Sept. 30, 1938), reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 330. 
 256.  PITTMAN POTTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
494, 500 (1925). 
 257.  Neville Chamberlain, Statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons 
(June 21, 1938), reprinted in BEST, supra note 11, at 200. 
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bombardment” envisioned by diplomats in the inter-war era. Still, it 
remains telling  that diplomats and jurists did not repudiate such wartime 
practices when the war ended. 
The UN Charter was drafted at a conference in San Francisco in the 
spring of 1945, when the ashes of Dresden were still warm and when 
American bombers were still releasing devastating payloads of napalm on 
Japanese cities. The Charter drafters took the precaution of stipulating that 
none of its provisions would apply to the ongoing war against the Axis 
powers.258  For the future, the Charter authorized the Security Council to 
make use of “air force contingents” to undertake “urgent military measures” 
for “international enforcement action.”259  The Charter offers no word of 
caution about the permissible limits of such “measures”—though in the 
circumstances of the time, the main participants would have been American 
and British air force units, who had learned their craft in massive raids 
against cities.260 
The Nuremberg trials did nothing to clarify existing law, either.261  The 
commander of the Luftwaffe was convicted along with top Luftwaffe 
officers, but not for bombing cities.262  Perhaps the tribunals were reluctant 
to condemn Germans for actions which Allied forces had conducted on a far 
larger scale.263  There were, of course, many other, unique atrocities for 
which German commanders could be blamed. 
German defendants occasionally pointed to the incongruity of judgment 
from those who had wreaked devastation upon so many cities.  Jurists on 
the Allied side did not respond defensively. In a proceeding against 
commanders of SS murder squads, German defense lawyers compared the 
defendants to pilots of Allied bombers, who also left a trail of death and 
destruction.  The American judges rejected the comparison with scorn: 
  
 
 258.  U.N. Charter art. 107. 
 259.  Id. at art. 45. 
 260.  Rather than providing the Security Council with its own air force, the Charter 
directs UN members to “hold immediately available national air-force contingents for 
combined international enforcement action” Id.  In 1945, only Britain and the United 
States could have provided such forces. 
 261.  See BEST, supra note 11, at 205 (noting that “[n]othing appeared in the judgments 
[at Nuremberg] that could take the law regarding aerial bombardment one inch further than 
where it had been on the day the war started.”).  
 262.  TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 325–26 (1992). 
 263.  Id. (noting that “the great city air raids of the war—Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden . . .—
had been conducted by Britain and the United States which made it most unlikely that the 
prosecution would make a big thing out of Germany’s earlier raids which, destructive as 
they were, paled by comparison.”). 
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A city is bombed for tactical purposes, communications are destroyed, railroads 
wrecked, ammunition plants demolished, factories razed, all to the purposes of 
impeding the military.  In these operations, it inevitably happens that non-military 
persons are killed.  This is an incident, a grave incident to be sure, but civilians 
are not individualized.  The bomb falls, it is aimed at railroad yards, houses along 
the track are hit and many of their occupants are killed.  But that is entirely 
different, both in fact and in law, from an armed force marching up to these same 
railroad trains, entering the houses abutting them, dragging out the men and 
women and children and shooting them.264 
In other words, devastation was not “wanton destruction” or “cruelty”— 
much less the deliberate infliction of “terror.” 
As if to confirm the distinction, another Nuremberg tribunal rejected a 
“war crimes” charge against General Lothar Rendulic, German commander 
in Norway, who had devastated a vast amount of property to impede an 
expected Allied invasion—which, as it turned out, never arrived.265  Destruction 
of property, even on a large scale, seemed to Nuremberg judges an 
acceptable tactic, especially if it did not involve large numbers of civilian 
deaths.266 
American commentators in the 1950s and 60s, at least those associated 
with the U.S. Defense Department, accordingly treated World War II 
bombing as within the accepted range of permissible tactics under the law 
of war.267  In the decades following the war, the victors were not disposed 
to reconsider the tactics that won them the victory.  They did participate 
in a 1949 conference in Geneva to elaborate “humanitarian” protections 
 
 264.  United States. v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, Judgment, 466–67 (Nuremberg Military 
Trib. Apr. 8–9, 1948). 
 265.  United States v. Wilhelm List, Case No. 7, Judgment, 1296–97 (Nuremberg 
Military Trib., Feb. 19, 1948).  The ruling is cited as continuing authority for the interpretation 
of “military necessity” in U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER, LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 134–35 (2014) [hereinafter JAG DESKBOOK].  
 266.  The same tribunal that acquitted General Rendulic of war crimes for devastation of 
property condemned Rendulic and others for executing civilian hostages. JAG DESKBOOK, 
supra note 265, at 134–35. 
 267.  See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 335–36 
(1959). “Under the category of factories, it is logical, in these days of total war, to include 
not only those which furnish the finished war products but also the factories which supply 
the materials, such as steel, from which those finished products are made.”  When the 
Germans disguised their factories, “the Allies evolved the tactic of target area bombing . . . 
that bombing is selective to the extent that the target is confined to a particular area and 
the purpose of the bombing is the destruction of a military objective, all other damage 
being incidental.” Id. See also K.J. RABY, BOMBARDMENT OF LAND TARGETS—MILITARY 
NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 70 (1968) (defending attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as “proportionate”). 
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in war.  The four resulting conventions focused on humanitarian concerns 
at the periphery: protections for wounded soldiers, for wounded and 
shipwrecked sailors, for prisoners of war, for civilians in zones of 
occupation in wartime.268  None of the 1949 conventions supplied rules 
for the conduct of ongoing fighting, such as permissible targeting in the 
conduct of military operations. 
A few years later, the Red Cross offered a model for a new convention 
to do that.  The “Draft Rules,” published by the ICRC in 1956, gave wide 
scope to air attacks.  The proposal re-emphasized the historic prohibition 
on “attacks against the civilian population, whether with the object of 
terrorizing it or for any other reason ….”269  It depicted protection for 
property as merely a derivative concern:  “In consequence [of the immediately 
preceding prohibition on attacking “the civilian population”], it is also 
forbidden to attack dwellings, installations or means of transport, which 
are for the exclusive use of, and occupied by, the civilian population.”270  
It went on to reassert the connection in a somewhat broader prohibition:  
“In order to limit the dangers incurred by the civilian population, attacks 
may only be directed against military objectives.”271  It then characterized 
such “objectives” as those “generally acknowledged to be of military 
importance”272 and offered the additional qualification that even if a target 
met this formal requirement, it could not be attacked unless “their total or 
partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers no 
military advantage.”273 
On the whole, the ICRC’s formulation did not go very far from the sort 
of admonition that higher commanders might have offered their own air 
squadrons—don’t waste effort on attacks that offer “no military 
advantage.”274  In two particulars, the Draft rules ventured a bit further.  
 
 268.  The four conventions signed at Geneva on 12 August 1949: Convention (I) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War; Convention (IV) Relative to the Proteciton of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 459–631. 
 269.  ICRC, Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian 
Population in Time of War, art. 6 (Oct. 15, 1956) [hereinafter 1956 Draft Rules], reprinted 
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 341. 
 270.  Id. at art. 6, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
 271.  Id. at art. 7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 274.  1 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 169, at 15.  “The moral argument about 
strategic bombing . . . tended to degenerate into the drawing of distinctions between 
necessary and unnecessary destruction.  But at that point it merged with and became 
indistinguishable from the strategic argument, for clearly it was against every strategic 
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When there is a “choice open between several objectives” for the same 
“military advantage,” commanders are “required to select the one 
[objective] . . .which involves least danger for the civilian population.”275  
Even then, commanders must “refrain from the attack if, after due 
consideration, it is apparent that the loss and destruction [to “dwellings” 
of “civilians”] would be disproportionate to the military advantage  
anticipated.”276 
Even these formulations might be subject to varying interpretations, 
depending on how commanders define “military advantage” or how high 
(or low) a weight they gave to “loss and destruction.”  But in the 1950s, 
no major power embraced the Red Cross proposals. 
What gave momentum to the project was the sudden embrace of 
“humanitarian law” by the United Nations.  This embrace began at the UN 
conference in Tehran in 1968, which was supposed to commemorate the 
twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
propose ways of giving more effect to international human rights 
standards.277  By 1968, however, the UN had a much larger membership 
than in 1948 and “human rights” did not have such broad appeal with the 
new majority.278  The Tehran conference took place a year after Israel’s 
victory over Arab States in the Six Day War and at a time when the United 
States had deployed over half a million troops to an ongoing war in 
Vietnam.  Amidst denunciations of “imperialist” and “racist and colonial 
regimes,” the Tehran conference voted for a resolution calling for expansion 
of humanitarian protections.279 
The UN General Assembly also voted resolutions to this effect in 
1968280 and again in 1970.281  Major western States seem to have decided 
that if there had to be new conventions on the law of armed conflict, it 
 
precept to waste bombs, bombers and bomber crews upon attacks which were not held to 
be necessary.” Id. 
 275.  1956 Draft Rules, supra note 269, at art. 8(a). 
 276.  Id. at art. 8(b). 
 277.  SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 84–119 (2010). 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  International Conference on Human Rights Resolution XII, May 12, 1968, 
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 347–48. 
 280.  G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc 
A/7433 at 164 (Dec. 19, 1968), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 
1, at 349–50. 
 281.  G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc 
A/2675 (Dec. 9, 1970), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 353–
54. 
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was safer to negotiate them under the auspices of the Red Cross than of 
the UN.  Still, it is worth noting that even the UN resolutions placed 
emphasis on saving lives rather than mere property.282  
After an initial round of consultations with self-selected “experts,” the 
Red Cross produced drafts for two new conventions in 1973.  It then 
hosted a “diplomatic conference”—with representatives chosen by 
participating States—which set about adapting these proposed standards 
into formal treaty texts.  It took more than three years of negotiations to 
reach the results.  They were notably different from earlier Red Cross 
proposals. 
What emerged as Additional Protocol I was more demanding than the 
Red Cross draft of 1973 and certainly more so than the Draft Rules of 
1956.  Where the 1956 draft puts almost all emphasis on protecting the 
“civilian populations”—lives, rather than property—the 1973 draft and 
the 1977 final text of AP–I contain a separate section on protection for 
“civilian objects.”283  Where the 1973 draft offered a seemingly limited 
list of “civilian objects”—“objects designed for civilian use, such as 
houses, dwellings, installations and means of transport”284—the final text 
of AP–I prohibits attacks on all “objects” which are not “military 
objectives.”285 
Where the 1956 Draft Rules defined “military objectives” as those 
“generally acknowledged to be of military importance,”286 AP–I defines 
the term as “objects . . . which make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in 
the circumstances, ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”287  
Where the 1973 Draft prohibited reprisals against “the civilian population 
 
 282.  The 1968 resolution makes no mention of property: “[a]ffirms . . . That it is 
prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such; That distinction must 
be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the 
civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.”  G.A. Res. 
2444, supra note 280, at ¶ 1. The 1970 resolution again emphasizes protection for civilian 
life: “In the conduct of military operations, every effort should be made to spare civilian 
populations form the ravages of war and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid 
injury, loss or damage to civilian populations.”  The one reference to physical “installations” 
links them to this overriding concern with civilian life: “Dwellings and other installations 
that are used only [emphasis added] by civilian populations should not be the object of 
attack.”  G.A. Res. 2675, supra note 281, at ¶¶ 3, 5. 
 283.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52 (“General protection of civilian objects”). 
 284.  ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, art. 47, (Oct. 1973) [hereinafter 1973 Draft], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military 
Law/pdf/RC-Draft-additional-protocols.pdf. 
 285.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52, ¶ 1. 
 286.  1956 Draft Rules, supra note 269, at art. 7. 
 287.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52, ¶ 2. 
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or civilians,”288 the final text of AP–I augments this with a separate 
prohibition against “reprisals” directed at “civilian objects.”289 
Such surface comparisons, however, miss one of the central political 
dramas at the Diplomatic Conference.  In the first weeks of the conference, 
as a specialized committee scrutinized the proposed provisions on the 
conduct of hostilities, Arab delegations moved to amend the Red Cross 
proposal for what became Art. 51.  In the Red Cross version it prohibited 
“attacks which may be expected to entail incidental losses among the 
civilian population and cause the destruction of civilian objects to an 
extent disproportionate to the direct and substantial military advantage 
anticipated.”290  Eleven Arab States proposed to “substitute ‘or’ for ‘and’ 
before ‘cause’”—so that attacks would be forbidden, even if they caused 
“disproportionate” harm to “civilian objects,” even if there were no actual 
injuries to civilians.291  The same amendment then proposed to “put a full 
stop after ‘objects’ and delete the rest of the paragraph.”292  If this proposal 
had been adopted, damage to “civilian objects” would be prohibited, even 
if it might provide “direct and substantial military advantage” and even if 
such advantage might be regarded as “proportionate” to the harm involved.  
As the delegate from Iraq explained, “it would be impossible to prove that 
the military advantage expected was in fact disproportionate.”293 
A few years earlier, Egypt and Israel had repeatedly traded attacks as 
Egypt tried to harry Israeli forces entrenched on the Suez Canal.  The 
Egyptians launched small-scale raids at Israeli military forces, and Israeli 
bombers struck at bases in Egypt. In one such Israeli attack, an Egyptian 
school was hit, provoking indignant denunciations from Cairo and other 
Arab capitals.294  The area behind the Israeli forces was largely empty 
 
 288.  1973 Draft, supra note 284, at art. 46, ¶ 4. 
 289.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52, ¶ 1. 
 290.  Id. at art. 46, ¶ 3(b). 
 291.  HOWARD LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 
GENEVA CONVENTION, VOL. III 129 (1980). 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. at 133. 
 294.  Raymond Anderson, 30 Pupils in U.A.R. Said to Die in Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.  
9, 1970, at 1.  William Touhy, Mystery Engulfs Bomb Deaths of 30 Egyptian School Children, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1970 (reporting disputes about whether school was located next to a 
military base, as Israel claimed: foreign journalists were not allowed to inspect the site).  
For the context, see BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE  ZIONIST-
ARAB CONFLICT, 1881–1998, at 355–58 (1999) (describing Soviet provision of surface to 
air missiles for Egyptian defense against Israeli Air Force attacks, culminating in an attack 
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desert, while the Egyptian army was operating from areas with much 
civilian infrastructure.  Israeli bombers could strike at some distance, while 
Egyptian rockets at that point could not.295  The formula proposed by Arab 
delegates in Geneva was perfectly designed to condemn Israeli actions 
while leaving an open field to Egyptian tactics. 
Even the Red Cross draft of 1973 acknowledged the problem, while at 
the same time accommodating the tactic.  The last paragraph of the article 
that became Article 51 admonished that the “presence or movements of 
the civilian population shall not be used for military purposes, in particular 
in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour 
or impede military operations.”296 Yet it then immediately offered a 
countering admonition, that even where one side “in violation of the 
foregoing provision, uses civilians with the aim of shielding military 
objectives from attack,” the opposing side must still take required 
“precautions” to avoid “losses in civilian lives and damage to civilian 
objects” which would be “disproportionate.”297  The Federal Republic of 
Germany, along with Canada, Brazil, and Nicaragua, moved to strike the 
entire follow-on sentence (regarding the continuing obligation to take 
“precautions”) lest it diminish the force of the main prohibition on using 
civilians to shield military placements.  That proposed amendment was 
not approved.298 
Western States remained all the more determined to retain references to 
“proportionality.”  As a Canadian delegate explained, “a reference to 
proportionality was necessary.  An absolute prohibition would result in a 
very difficult situation [for commanders], for instance when there was a 
single civilian near a major military objective whose presence might deter 
an attack.”299  East German and Romanian delegates urged that 
“proportionality” be stricken, as did China and North Korea, the latter 
explaining that “acceptance of the principle of proportionality would 
provide war criminals with a pretext for their crimes.”300  The U.K. 
delegate responded that it would be wrong to “put forward formulations 
which would not in practice be followed.  To do away with proportionality 
 
that hit an elementary school—after which the U.S. declined to supply to equipment to the 
Israeli Air Force). 
 295.  See CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 214–18 (2d. ed., 2005) (noting 
that during the 1969–1970 “War of Attrition,” Israeli jets struck “deep into Egypt,” 
including some bases on the Nile, while Soviet supplied surface-to-air (SAM) missiles 
allowed the Egyptians a range of less than 18 miles) 
 296.  1973 Draft, supra note 284, at art. 46, ¶ 5.  
 297.  Id. 
 298.  LEVIE, supra note 291, at 125. 
 299.  Id. at 134. 
 300.  Id. at 138. 
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would remove a valuable humanitarian protection from the civilian 
population”301 
British and American delegates both insisted, in separate presentations, 
that the “rule of proportionality” was based on “existing international 
law”302  This claim was challenged by the delegate of North Vietnam, who 
demanded to know “what documents in positive international law had 
provided any foundation for such an assertion?”303  He did not receive an 
explicit response. 
The formulation that ultimately emerged in AP–I was, in effect, a 
victory for western States, acknowledging that harm to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects was, indeed, permissible.  Even the wording of 
this concession was somewhat improved from the western perspective.  
The 1973 Red Cross draft required that harm not be “disproportionate to 
the direct and substantial military advantage anticipated.”304  The final text 
of AP–I only required that such harm not be “excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”305  Arguably the new 
wording permitted even “disproportionate” harm, if not “excessive” and 
if balanced against a “concrete advantage,” even if not necessarily a 
“substantial advantage.”  At any rate, the final text of AP–I clearly 
acknowledged that attacks would still be regarded as lawful even if they 
did impose some level of harm to civilians and civilian objects. 
This permissive reading of the AP–I formula gains additional support 
from the fate of the second convention negotiated at the same Geneva 
conference, Additional Protocol II (“AP–II”).306  Here, the debate over the 
proportionality language in AP–I was almost turned inside out.  The Red 
Cross prepared a draft that largely tracked the provisions for AP–I.307  The idea 
was to provide comparable protections for victims of non-international 
 
 301.  Id. at 140. 
 302.  Id. at 142. According to U.S. delegate Aldrich, “[t]he rule of proportionality . . . 
was based on existing international law and it was important to record.” Id. According to 
U.K. delegate Freeland “[t]he . . . rule of proportionality was a useful codification of a 
concept that was rapidly becoming accepted by all states as an important principle of 
international law relating to armed conflict.” Id. at 165.  
 303.  Id. at 148. 
 304.  1973 Draft, supra note 284, at art. 46, ¶ 3(b). 
 305.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52, ¶ 5(b). 
 306.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP–II], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
supra note 1, at 776–83. 
 307.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 1225–36. 
RABKIN-EICADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:16 PM 
 
316 
conflicts as for international conflicts.  The two conventions were actually 
discussed in tandem throughout most of the proceedings.  After years of 
deliberation, however, delegates from less-developed countries—those 
most likely to face internal conflicts spiraling into full-scale war—began 
to resist the project.308  Early on, they won agreement that struggles for 
“liberation” from “colonial or racist” regimes should be treated as 
“international conflicts,” as the opening article for AP–I eventually 
stipulated.309  They decided they did not want these rules applied to what 
they considered entirely internal conflicts. 
The Pakistani delegation accordingly proposed a drastic reduction in 
the text of AP–I.  Rather than rewriting AP–I, the proposal offered a 
selective sampling of AP–I provisions, reducing the length by half.310  The 
provisions regarding “excessive” harm in relation to “military advantage” 
—the proportionality provisions—were excluded.311  That was the price 
for getting Third World delegates (as they were then considered) to agree 
to any convention on non-international conflicts. 
The Red Cross tried to salvage the bargain by insisting that the spirit of 
the provisions remained in AP–II’s abbreviated presentation of rules 
spelled-out in AP–I.  The main AP–II provision on permissible attacks says 
this:  “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall 
not be the object of attack.  Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”312  
According to the Red Cross Commentary, this “radical simplification” of 
the scheme set out in AP–I (proportionality and so on) “does not reduce 
 
 308.  Id. at 1335; BEST, supra note 11, at 417. 
 309.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 52, ¶ 4. This paragraph extends AP–I coverage to 
“include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination. . .” Id. 
 310.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 1335.  The draft version of AP–II, 
prepared by a conference of legal experts in 1973, had 49 articles, which were reduced to 
24 in the Pakistani proposal. Id. at 1333. The text agreed-to in 1977 has 28 articles, with 
the addition of several non-substantive provisions at the end.  In THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, supra note 1, the text of AP–I occupies 51 pages, while the text of AP–II takes 
up only 8 pages. 
 311.  In AP–I, the “proportionality” rule appears in the middle of a somewhat 
elaborate set of requirements limiting attacks that might affect civilians. AP–I, supra note 
1, at art. 51 (“Protection of the Civilian Population”); the corresponding article in AP–II 
contains only three short paragraphs, the most substantive of which (Par. 2) prohibits 
making the civilian population “the object of attack” but says nothing about incidental 
harm to civilians from attacks not primarily aimed at civilians. AP–II, supra note 306, at 
art. 13 (“Protection of the civilian population”). 
 312.  AP–II, supra note 306, at art. 13, ¶ 2. 
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the degree of protection which was originally envisaged, for despite its 
brevity [this provision] reflects the most fundamental rules.”313 
This claim is entirely plausible if one views the specifications omitted 
as mere elaboration, rather than free-standing, entirely new requirements.  
If that is true, however, the ultimate text of AP–II is additional evidence 
for the proposition that AP–I does not impose ambitious new restrictions.  
The AP–I requirements merely clarify the logic of what AP–II provides.  As 
UN resolutions before the conference had indicated, the main point of 
humanitarian law is to protect human lives—not the whole range of 
inanimate objects that might be labeled “civilian.”314 
Specific innovations in AP–I suggest a similar priority.  One provision 
prohibited, for the first time in an international convention, “starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare.”315  This prohibition was reinforced with 
an ensuing prohibition against seeking to destroy “objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs . . . drinking 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose 
of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population.”316  
A subsequent provision prohibited attacks on “installations containing 
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations.”317 
All of these specific prohibitions might be seen as tacitly acknowledging 
the limited reach of the general rules limiting attacks on “civilian objects” 
and “excessive” loss or damage to civilians and civilian objects.  If the 
general provisions were to be interpreted very strictly, the specific prohibitions 
would not have been necessary. 
Western States do not seem to have viewed AP–I as changing the earlier 
understandings of permissible targets or permissible levels of collateral 
damage.  American critics, urging that the text of AP–I should not be 
ratified by the Senate, focused on new protections for guerrilla fighters 
 
 313.  Id. at art. 13. Though the Commentary does not call attention to this fact, the 
AP–II version omits any reference to destruction of “civilian objects”—inanimate stuff, as 
opposed to actual human beings.  It bars deliberate attacks on civilians for the purpose of 
terrorizing them—and attacks on “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population (Art. 14)—but does not provide express general protection for “civilian objects” as 
such. 
 314.  See supra notes 310–11. 
 315.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 54, ¶ 1. 
 316.  Id. at art. 54, ¶ 2. 
 317.  Id. at art. 56. 
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and a number of other changes.318  There was remarkably little controversy 
about the provision of AP–I on proportionality. 
In July 1976, even before the final text of AP–I was settled, the Chief 
of Staff of the U.S. Army notified army lawyers of updates to the Manual 
of Land Warfare.  Among other small changes, it reworded the language 
from the 1956 Manual to accommodate the AP–I formula, stating that 
“loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
expected to be gained.”319  The U.S. Air Force also released a new manual 
on the law of armed conflict in 1976, which also embraced a version of 
the proportionality rule.320  This manual still discussed World War II 
bombing as if it were perfectly consistent with the rule.321   
Two years later, a Swedish participant in the Geneva negotiations 
published an article assessing the implications of AP–I.322  He noted that 
the U.S. Defense Department had claimed all bombing in Indochina had 
been consistent with the rule of proportionality.  He expressed considerable 
uneasiness with this claim, indicating that “If it [is still] . . . a considered 
U.S. opinion that the rule of proportionality was observed by U.S. forces 
throughout the war in that region [Indochina], the value of the rule to 
induce restraint could indeed be queried.”323  Indeed, it could be.  
  
 
 318.  See, e.g., Guy Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against 
Ratification, 26 VA. J. INT’L. L. 109 (1985); Douglas Feither, Law In the Service of Terror 
—The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 1 NAT’L INT. 45 (1985); Richard Baxter, 
Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165 (1977). 
 319.  Memorandum from General Fred Weyand, Chief of Staff and Paul Smith, 
Adjutant General (15 July 1956), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT  
DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 250 (International and Operational Law Dept, U.S. Army 
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center 2012). 
 320.  DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL ACTIVITIES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 5–10 
(1976).  
 321.  Id. at 5–5. “The Allies [in World War II] did not regard civilian populations and 
their housing as proper military targets and generally preferred to seek to destroy only the 
military aspects of cities. . . . The U.S. justified this use of the [atomic] weapons on the 
basis that the two cities destroyed [Hiroshima and Nagasaki] were involved in war 
production.  The destruction of the two cities persuaded the Japanese government to seek 
peace quickly.” Id. 
 322.  Hans Blix, Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 31 
(1978). 
 323.  Id. at 51, n.2. 
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VI.  MORAL BEARINGS: THE CONDUCT OF WAR CANNOT BE                 
ENTIRELY SEPARATED FROM THE CAUSES OF WAR 
Regardless of actual legislative history or plausible parsing of textual 
provisions, when a measure aims at a compelling public purpose, 
interpreters are bound to read it in ways that seem to serve the underlying 
purpose.  Since “humanitarian” protection in war serves an obviously 
compelling purpose, the tendency might seem particularly hard to resist.  
Accordingly, the Red Cross has struggled to interpret restrictions in the 
Additional Protocols as restrictively as possible.  Even if one sets aside 
treaty texts and looks at underlying moral claims, however, the issues are 
by no means as simple as the Red Cross version suggests.  Advocates for 
humanity are not always the best judges of what serves their own professed 
aims. 
One way of seeing the point is to notice that the International Committee 
of the Red Cross does not have a record to inspire great confidence in its 
moral judgment.  Before the Second World War, it focused on ancillary 
issues, mostly protection for medical personnel, wounded combatants, 
and prisoners of war—the subjects of the Geneva Conventions of 1864 
and 1929.324  Amidst the challenges of the Second World War, it sought 
to play a larger role.  Its efforts in this direction were not taken seriously 
at the time.325  In retrospect, it is clear that the Red Cross did not deserve 
to be taken seriously. 
In the fall of 1940, as German bombers were battering London, the 
ICRC proposed to monitor bomb damage in Britain and Germany so that 
each side could avoid unintended harm to civilians and civilian property.  
Churchill rejected the proposal on the grounds that the Red Cross, “under 
German influence or fear,” was “very likely [to] report that we had committed 
the major breaches.”326 
 
 324.  CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, DUNANT’S DREAM: WAR, SWITZERLAND, AND THE 
HISTORY OF THE RED CROSS 309–13 (1998).  Since there was also a 1925 Geneva 
Convention banning the use of poison gas in warfare, the Red Cross was urged to protest 
gassing of civilians in Italy’s war against Ethiopia in 1936; the Red Cross declined to make 
any public comment, declined even to share what it knew with officials of the League of 
Nations. Id. 
 325.  Id. at 389–90.  When the ICRC protested Britain’s food blockade in 1940, the 
British Foreign Office gave it little attention: “the British government seems to have been 
unaware of precisely what the International Committee [of the Red Cross] did.” 
 326.  6 MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON CHURCHILL, FINEST HOUR, 1939–1941, at 832 
(1983) (citing Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, addressed to Lord Halifax, 13 October 
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Churchill’s initial suspicions were borne-out by subsequent events.  The 
Red Cross declined to make any public condemnation of the murder 
campaign against the Jews, despite repeated pleas to do so from anguished 
observers (including clergymen) in occupied territories.  The ICRC 
decided that adding its own voice to Allied condemnations would 
compromise the neutrality of the Red Cross.327  At the very end of the war, 
a Red Cross emissary helped to save thousands of concentration camp 
inmates from a final massacre by summoning a nearby American patrol 
to their rescue.  He was banished from the Red Cross and hounded out of 
Switzerland.  Neutrality was a much higher priority for the Red Cross than 
humanity.328 
 
1940).  Apart from questioning the ICRC’s neutrality, Churchill rejected the Red Cross 
approach to humanitarian law, declaring “we do not want these people thrusting themselves in, 
as even if Germany offered to stop the bombing now, we should not consent to it.  
Bombing of military objectives, increasingly widely interpreted, seems at present our main 
road home.” Id. 
 327.  See JEAN-CLAUDE FAVEZ, THE RED CROSS AND THE HOLOCAUST 81, 282 (John 
& Beryl Fletcher trans., Cambridge Press 1999) (1988).  This careful study by a senior 
Swiss scholar, to whom the ICRC and the Swiss government opened their files, documents 
that the actual policy was not “indecisive,” as later claimed, but relentlessly consistent: the 
ICRC considered a number of different options but always decided to remain aloof – in 
the name of neutrality.  In practice, the ICRC was influenced by pressures from the Swiss 
government, answering to the priorities of a particular nation, anxious to avoid provoking 
a dangerous neighbor (which, through most of the war, controlled territory on all sides of 
Switzerland).  Only in the last months of the war did the Red Cross make concerted efforts 
to persuade German authorities to allow food parcels to be sent to concentration camps. 
“The [impending] Allied victory was fraught with danger not only for the traditional 
position of Switzerland in Europe and especially for its neutrality but also for the ICRC . . . 
The attitude of the United States and therefore of the powerful American Red Cross almost 
spelt the end of the ICRC and a complete overhaul of the Red Cross’s world. . . . the 
probability of speedy victory in the West increased the pressure on the ICRC to approach 
things anew, to make a protective gesture for once. . . . The Swiss authorities, finally, 
pressed the ICRC to act, to widen its scope and to raise itself to the level of energetic action 
demanded by a continent once again [sic!] at war.” Id. at 81.  Even then, the ICRC’s efforts 
did not amount to much, as “even the material aid it was able to deliver ha[d] not succeeded 
in convincing the world that it had given sufficient proof in this instance of its 
effectiveness, all the more so because it did not take the supreme risk of throwing the full 
weight of its moral authority into the scales on behalf of these particular victims [in Nazi 
concentration camps]. . . we have no choice but to recognize that it really should have 
spoken out . . . In its way of working, in its methods of analysis, in its political perspective, 
the ICRC was by then out of phase with the ideological struggle that was what World War 
II was really about.” Id. at 282. In the supreme humanitarian catastrophe of modern times, 
all the ICRC’s rhetoric about “humanity”—as a set of claims abstracted from the needs of 
any particular nation—proved to be mere words, making no serious claim at all on its 
actions. 
 328.  Johannes Starmuehler, Dissertation, Louis Haefliger und die Befrieung des 
Konzentrationslagers Mauthasusen 55–66 (Jan. 2008), available at http://othes.univie. 
ac.at/447/1/01-22-2008_0104393.pdf. As Starmuehler reports, the ICRC not only officially 
repudiated Hafliger for assisting an armed force (the American liberators) but then refused 
RABKIN-EICADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:16 PM 
[VOL. 16:  263, 2015]  Proportionality in Perspective 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 321 
For all its emphasis on neutrality, the ICRC did, during the war, maintain 
close and respectful relations with the Red Cross of the Third Reich, 
headed by an SS doctor who performed ghoulish experiments on inmates 
of concentration camps.  He was celebrated in Geneva publications.329  
After the war, the Red Cross played a large role in helping Nazi war 
criminals, including Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele, escape capture 
by Allied investigators and reach safe havens in South America.330  The 
Red Cross was devoted to “humanity” at such a high level of abstraction 
that leading war criminals had as much claim on its sympathy as other 
“displaced persons.” 
All this might seem remote history for which the Red Cross eventually 
expressed regret, but the same perspective shines through ICRC 
pronouncements on humanitarian law in the post-war era.  Four decades 
after the end of the Second World War, the Red Cross Commentary on 
AP–I continued to cast that war as a conflict in which both sides departed 
from traditional norms, equally so, in this account: 
  
 
to compensate him for financial losses he incurred in his service, then disparaged him to 
former and prospective employers in the Swiss banking community, so that Haefliger was 
unable to find work in Switzerland and lived the rest of his life in exile.  In 1997, after a 
series of smaller gestures beginning in 1990, ICRC President Cornelius Sommaruga 
offered public recognition to Haefliger—who by then had streets named after him in 
Vienna and in Tel Aviv.  Sommaruga also offered a general “apology”—of sorts—for the 
ICRC’s “indecisiveness” during World War II.  To preserve the tradition of neutrality, he 
accompanied these statements with a criticism of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories. “Protecting War Victims: Lessons of the Past, Challenges for the Future,” Address 
at Chatham House, London, Sept. 15, 1997. 
 329.  MOOREHEAD, supra note 324, at 356–63, 467–69 (1998). Articles about Dr. 
Ernst Grawitz and the DRK (Deutsche Roten Kreuze, German Red Cross) did not, of 
course, mention medical atrocities.  On the issue of medical experiments on civilians— 
technically, not covered by previous treaties—the Red Cross remained neutral.  And silent. 
 330.  GERALD STEINACHER, NAZIS ON THE RUN: HOW HITLER’S HENCHMEN FLED 
JUSTICE 70–71, 97, 99 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (2008). The ICRC provided false identity 
papers to Eichmann and Mengele and many other leading war criminals, even after the 
U.S. State Department urged “immediate and drastic action” to reform the Red Cross 
practice of handing out documents with little or no inquiry or verification, warning that 
existing Red Cross practices would “arouse suspicion and distrust” toward the International 
Red Cross role. Steinacher concluded “The ICRC continued issuing unverified travel 
documents, long after it became aware of abuses.  Thus the ICRC bears a certain amount 
of moral responsibility.” Id. at 99.  
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Although the basic principle [regarding “protection of the civilian population”] 
remained unquestioned, the enormous development of the means of warfare 
jeopardized the principle in practice.  Finally, alleging that they were only carrying 
out reprisals, the belligerents went so far as to wage war almost indiscriminately, 
which resulted in heavy losses among the civilian population and culminated in 
the dropping of the nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.331 
Some 350,000 German civilians were killed in Allied bombing raids; some 
forty times that number of civilians were killed by German execution 
squads or in German extermination camps during the war.332  It makes a 
difference, after all, whether killing is the actual object of one’s policies.  
One must be extremely committed to neutrality to find, as the Red Cross 
does, some underlying symmetry between the war policies of the western 
allies and the Third Reich.  Red Cross officials did display that sort of 
commitment, both during and after the war and even when off-duty. 
During the Second World War, when the Red Cross contemplated 
issuing protests against Germany’s attempt to destroy European Jewry, its 
staff drafted texts that would simultaneously denounce Allied bombing of 
German cities.333  Even decades later, the ICRC’s leading commentator, a 
veteran of these wartime drafting exercises, published a book in which 
Allied bombing was linked with the Holocaust, as comparable or at least 
parallel horrors.334 
The Red Cross, vaunting its neutrality, insists that it does not take a 
position on when war is justified, a branch of law known to scholars as 
jus ad bellum (the law on resort to war).  It simply tries to ensure that 
 
 331.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 586. A note indicates this passage 
was contributed by “JP,” which is short for Jean Pictet,. Pictet studied in Vienna in the 
1930s and was a Red Cross lawyer in his early 30s during the Second World War. He was 
involved in several abortive efforts to craft ICRC public protests against wartime 
atrocities. 
 332.  Estimates by post-war German researchers placed the number of German 
civilians killed by Allied bombing at 650,000, a figure that has been widely reported since. 
More recent research indicates a more “plausible” figure is about 350,000. OVERY, supra 
note 167, at 307.  Recent studies by German historians calculate that apart from 5.7 million 
Jews, there were probably more than 7 million others deliberately murdered on the ground, 
though their deaths were not as carefully tabulated at the time; see DIETER POHL, 
VERFOLGUNG UND MASSENMORD IN NS-ZEIT, 1933–1945, at 153 (2003). The resulting 13 
million figure is 37 times larger than the estimated civilian casualties now attributed to 
Allied bombing. 
 333.   MOOREHEAD, supra note 324, at 420 (describing abortive discussions of a 
public statement condemning abuses of humanitarian law by all sides in the war—drafted 
by the young Jean Pictet). 
 334.   JEAN PICTET, L’EPOPEE DES PEAUX-ROUGES [Epic of the Red Skins] 20 (1988) 
“Since the Second World War and the horror of the concentration camps and the 
indiscriminate bombing, where millions of innocents found a hideous death, one looks at 
the barbarism of the Indians with different eyes: they, at least, behaved with savagery 
because they were savages.” Id. (Rabkin translation from French original). 
RABKIN-EICADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:16 PM 
[VOL. 16:  263, 2015]  Proportionality in Perspective 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 323 
when armed conflict occurs, it will be bound by rules for conducing war, 
the so-called jus in bello (law on the conduct of war).  Some such division 
of rules has helped to encourage restraint in the conduct of war.  An army 
that sees itself fighting for a just cause will think that its enemy is wrong 
to be fighting at all.  In such circumstances, armies might be tempted to 
engage in limitless brutality—if they did not recognize separate rules of 
restraint regarding the conduct of war, as opposed to rules regarding resort 
to war, in the first place.  Commanders and commentators have recognized 
the logic of this distinction for many centuries.335 
Until the second half of the Twentieth Century, however, the impulse 
to isolate rules of conduct in war was not regarded as a fundamental 
principle, overriding all distinctions of context and circumstance.  The 
Latin terminology—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—seems to lend these 
formal terms the authority of Cicero or, at least, Grotius. In fact, they are 
coinages from the 1930s that have no established or generally accepted 
predecessors.336  The prevalent use of this terminology in recent decades 
owes much to the insistent rhetorical efforts of the Red Cross and 
associated humanitarian advocates. 
The campaign is designed to suggest that one set of rules covers all 
conflicts, at least for the way wars are fought.  The Red Cross has insisted 
that all “armed conflict” is now covered by the same rules, a claim 
endorsed by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.337  If 
 
 335.  Robert Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR, CONSTRAINTS IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 29 (Michael Howard ed., 1994) (noting that by the Tenth and Eleventh 
Centuries, “the bearing of arms was seen as a noble dignity connected with a code of 
conduct, the violation of which might cost a man his status as a warrior” and the code 
sought to “define and protect the status of non-combatants,” though not in wars against 
non-Christians); Christopher Allmand, War and the Non-Combatant in the Middle Ages, 
in MEDIEVAL WARFARE 262, 265 (Maurice Keen ed., 1999) (commenting that while “the 
person of the non-combatant should be respected unless he offered resistance, his 
property . . . constituted a legitimate target,” by the Fourteenth Century, even attacks on 
property were protested when done to “excess”—as the “principle of proportionality . . . was 
beginning to find widespread support” in opinion). 
 336.  Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, 320 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 553 (1997). 
 337.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal for Jurisdiction, Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 
1995. “Why protect civilians from belligerent violence or ban rape, torture or the wanton 
destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe 
weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war and 
yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed 
violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State?” Id. at para. 97. 
RABKIN-EICADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:16 PM 
 
324 
the rules are meant to protect humanity, shouldn’t they be the same in all 
conflicts? Whatever the merits of such reasoning in respect of ongoing 
civil wars, it does not follow that all wars should be fought by the same 
rules.  The distinction between “international” and “non-international” 
conflicts is not the only distinction that matters. 
The political theorist Michael Walzer sparked renewed interest in 
philosophic questions about war in his 1977 work, Just and Unjust Wars.338  
On the whole, it tries to offer a rigorous defense of civilian immunity 
based on a separation of jus in bello obligations from disputes about jus 
ad bellum.  Even Walzer, however, conceded that extreme challenges 
might justify extreme measures—if, say, this were the only way to avoid 
total defeat by an unrestrained aggressor.  In such cases, he acknowledged, 
it might be morally defensible to apply a “sliding scale,” giving more 
tactical leeway to tactics employed by the defending side against unjust 
aggression.339  On this basis, he argued that British bombing of German 
cities might have been morally justifiable, but only in the early years of 
the war, when Britain was at serious risk of losing the war altogether.340 
There is intuitive appeal to this argument, which is why other critics of 
Allied bombing have endorsed it.341  It faces obvious difficulties, however.  
If it was morally justifiable to bomb Berlin in 1940, there must have been 
some reason to hope that such air attacks would achieve some militarily 
significant result in impeding German war efforts.  If that was plausible 
in 1940, when Britain had only very limited bombing capacity, why not 
in 1943, when Germany still dominated most of Europe, but Britain could 
deliver far more damage from the air?  If it was morally defensible to 
bomb Berlin in 1940, why not Dresden in February 1945?  As noted above, 
some 20,000 German civilians died in that attack, but why did they have 
more claim to British concern than the hundreds of thousands of prisoners 
(most from Allied nations) still held in concentration camps and work camps 
inside Germany?  After all, such prisoners were held in such extreme 
conditions that their lives might have been lost or saved, depending on 
whether the war dragged on for many more months (as was feared in 
 
 338.  See generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977). 
 339.  Id. at 229–32. 
 340.  Id. at 255–62. 
 341.  See, e.g., STEPHAN GARRETT, ETHICS AND AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR II 183 
(1993) (commenting that “[w]hatever rationales may be offered for the British area bombing 
offensive against Germany prior to the spring of 1944, after that date it was quite without 
ethical foundation”) Sven Lindqvist, The War Against Women and Children, in INVENTING 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE 287 (Stephen Rockel and Rick Hapern eds., 2009) (arguing that he 
“agree[s] . . . that the residential raids [on German cities] were militarily and politically 
necessary in 1940–41 . . . but from 1942 on [defenders of the strategy] can no longer show 
that [these raids] were necessary”). 
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February 1945) or whether hard blows would allow Allied armies to smash 
into Germany within a few more weeks. 
Different wars justify different responses.  To think about what kind of 
war is involved, it is not plausible to think about jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum claims as if they could be considered in total isolation from each 
other.  If it is more urgent to win, it is more permissible to use destructive 
means of winning when that does promise to bring a surer or speedier 
victory. 
A recent example makes the point.  When Russia seized the Ukrainian 
province of Crimea in March 2014, the UN General Assembly denounced 
the action as a clear violation of the UN Charter. 342  Throughout the Cold 
War, NATO threatened nuclear retaliation against westward aggression 
by the Soviet military.  Nobody thought of doing that to stop Russian 
aggression against Ukraine.  Nobody was willing to offer any serious military 
response.  As the Russian seizure of Crimea was accomplished by the 
infiltration of special agents with no bloodshed, international protests were 
not followed up with serious retaliatory measures.343  Had Moscow enforced 
its claims on Crimea through a nuclear strike on Kiev, the response would 
surely have been very different. 
In the mid-1980s, the Red Cross suggested in its Commentary that AP–I 
implied a rule against the use of nuclear weapons.344  A decade later, however, 
when the question of nuclear weapons use was put to the International 
Court of Justice, the court still could not muster a majority in support of 
that conclusion.345  In an extreme circumstance, it might be proper to use 
nuclear weapons to avoid national annihilation.  Most western countries, 
when ratifying AP–I, included a reservation stipulating that it did not 
make resort to nuclear weapons unlawful in all circumstances.346  Germany, 
which had prided itself on its faithful adherence to international law, 
accordingly has supplied nuclear submarines to Israel, with the clear  
 
 342.  G.A. Res. 68/242, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/68/242 (Apr. 1, 
2014), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262. 
 343.  For compelling analysis of the technical disputes about whether cross-border 
infiltration in Crimea constituted “armed attack” under the UN Charter, see Robert Delahunty, 
The Crimean Crisis, U. ST. THOMAS J. L. PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2015). 
 344.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 589–96. 
 345.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 66 (July 8). 
 346.  See supra note 28. 
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understanding that they would be equipped with nuclear tipped missiles 
as a deterrent against nuclear attack.347 
Relaxing jus in bello restrictions in this way might seem justified only 
for extremely urgent defense claims.  In fact, historically, a similar 
relaxation of jus in bello rules was thought to apply at the other end of the 
spectrum, where the stakes were too low for all-out war. 
In the Nineteenth Century and even down to the Second World War, 
major powers often resorted to limited uses of force to compel a lesser 
state to refrain from abusive conduct.348  Among other things, affronted 
powers would use naval forces to close the ports of an offending state, as 
Britain and Germany did to Venezuela in 1902 to compel payment of 
debts to British and German creditors.349  The practice was sometimes 
called “gunboat diplomacy,” because it relied on naval war ships for 
coercive measures that were not regarded as “war.”  No one seems to have 
thought such “pacific reprisals” were governed by the details of the Hague 
Convention, at least with regard to provisions against destruction of non-
military property.350  Destruction of non-military property—such as 
warehouses with civilian goods—was one of the main tactics.351 
As a legal matter, governments and legal commentators could argue that 
the law of war did not apply because such punitive measures were not 
“war.”  As a strategic matter, “pacific reprisals” were designed to address 
very discrete disputes, so there was far less concern that reprisals would 
provoke counter-measures, spiraling into unrestrained violence.  Bright-
line rules distinguishing civilian property from legitimate “military 
objectives” seemed less compelling than in full-scale war. 
While the terminology has changed, the tactic remains.  When the United 
States bombed Tripoli in 1987, in reprisal for terror attacks on American 
servicemen in Europe, the point was to impose a cost on the Libyan dictator, 
 
 347.  Israel Deploys Nuclear Weapons on German Built Submarines, DER SPIEGEL 
(June 3, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear- 
weapons-on-german-submarines-a-836671.html. 
 348.  See generally, S. Macoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 60 (1924). 
 349.  ALBERT EDMOND HOGAN, PACIFIC BLOCKADE 151–57 (1908) (describing 15 
episodes of “pacific blockade” between 1832 and 1903, including Venezuela episode). 
    350.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 106, at 42–44 (“an act of reprisal [in peacetime] may be 
performed against anything and everything that belongs … to the delinquent State or its 
citizens”) 
     351. JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919–1991: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF 
LIMITED NAVAL FORCE (3d ed., 1994). In 1926, for example, bombardment from British 
warships severely damaged the Chinese city of Wanhsien, but did persuade the Chinese to 
release British merchant ships and crew members they had seized.  Id. at 164–75.  In 1923, 
Italian warships bombarded non-military buildings on the Greek island of Corfu as a 
means of persuading the Greek government to comply with Italian demands for reparation, 
after the killing of an Italian diplomat on Greek territory.  Id. at 37–42.   
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Muammar Gadhafi.352  When President Clinton bombed Iraq in the mid-
1990s, the point was to impose a cost on Saddam Hussein for resisting the 
monitoring efforts of international weapons inspectors.353  In both cases, 
efforts seem to have been made to avoid harm to civilians, perhaps even 
“civilian objects”—at least in the sense of private houses. Yet, destruction 
of the targets—government buildings—did not present a “concrete and 
direct military advantage” in an ongoing war.  Certainly not in the sense 
of making it harder for Gadhafi to organize terror raids or making it harder 
for Saddam to resist weapons inspectors—in the way that destroying a 
weapons depot would make it harder to equip an army in the field. 
The logic that applies to such limited reprisals may also apply to larger 
and longer interventions.  As the subsequent interventions in Libya and 
Iraq illustrate, contemporary wars don’t usually end with a formal surrender 
ceremony that brings a complete end to conflict.  In an age of ongoing 
guerrilla conflict, the meaning of “military advantage” is quite disputable.  
The implicit target might not only be guerrillas, but the civilian support 
system or the political authorities that provide them assistance.  The United 
States (under President Obama) claimed to be acting against a lawful target 
when it launched cruise missiles against Anwar al-Awlaki, a spiritual adviser 
to Al Qeda forces who seems to have had no particular military expertise 
or command authority.354   
The truth is that AP–I itself implicitly recognizes that different wars 
authorize different rules, or that different rules may apply to different 
sides in the same war.  The Red Cross Commentary explains the provision 
that allows guerrillas to operate out of uniform with the argument that, in 
some circumstances, reliance on disguised combatants—though it puts 
other civilians at risk—might be the only available form of resistance.  
And, as Red Cross commentators note, sometimes such resistance is 
approved by international law, as when it is resistance to colonial  
domination.355 That line of reasoning, however, implicitly recognizes that 
 
 352.  Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation 
Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 936 (1987). 
 353.  Sean Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action Against the Iraqi Threat, 161 
MIL. L. REV. 115, 148–49 (1999). 
 354.  Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, From Condemning Terror to Teaching Jihad, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1. 
 355.  Marco Sassoli [ICRC legal analyst], The Separation Between Legality of the 
Use of Force and Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Warfare, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULT-LINES 252 (Michael Schmitt ed., 2007). 
“[I]f national liberation wars and armed resistance against a technologically overwhelming 
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some methods of fighting may be justified in some conflicts, though they 
would not be proper in other conflicts.  If that is so, it offers another 
reminder that we cannot, after all, think about jus in bello (how fighting 
should be conducted) in complete abstraction from jus ad bellum (when 
and why it may be proper to fight).356  
Many advocates in the 1960s and 70s justified “wars of national 
liberation” as intrinsically just, or at least reflecting sufficient moral authority 
that resistance to guerrillas ought to operate within strict humanitarian 
limits, even if guerrillas could not themselves respect all humanitarian 
restraints.357  Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, first published shortly after 
the end of the American involvement in Vietnam, argued that difficulty in 
suppressing a guerrilla movement was proof that it was unjust to do so, 
because the guerrillas had broad civilian support.358  Whatever attraction 
that argument might have had to critics of the American involvement at 
the time, the subsequent triumph of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas should 
have given pause—as it led to the murder of nearly a million civilians in 
 
aggressor or foreign occupier are lawful under ius ad bellum, international humanitarian 
law cannot oulaw every efficient method to win such a war . . . .  Thus Protocol I had to 
lower the distinction regulation [requiring combatants to distinguish themselves from non-
combatants] to what is both possible to comply with in a guerrilla war and the minimum 
necessary to ensure respect for the civilian population.  Those who criticize this 
[accommodation] as ‘law in the service of terror’ want to have ius in bello bar the realization of 
ius ad bellum.” Id. 
 356.  WALZER, supra note 338, at 195–96. The point is argued by a number of 
philosophic papers published in the past decade. For some of the most compelling versions 
of this argument, see Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFFAIRS 34 (2005); Jeff MacMahn, Just Cause for War, 19 ETH. & INT’L AFF. 1 
(2005); Christopher Toner, The Logistical Structure of Just War Theory, 14 J. ETH. 81 
(2010); see also Cannizzaro, supra note 7, at 348 (commenting that proportionality is “far 
from being two separate legal regimes, ius in bello and ius ad belum continuously 
overlap . . . the full achievement of one might even make more difficult and even 
impossible the achievement of the aims of the other”).   
 357.  See, e.g., discussion of “wars of national liberation” in RED CROSS COMMENTARY, 
supra note 9, at 41–55 (citing UN resolutions and arguing that concessions must be made 
to “guerrilla tactics” in such wars).  
 358.  WALZER, supra note 338, at 188–96. The argument does not acknowledge that 
Viet Cong guerrillas were, in fact, effectively suppressed by American and South 
Vietnamese forces, which is why American withdrawal in 1973 was described at the time 
as “peace with honor.”  It was the invasion of an entirely conventional army from North 
Vietnam, powered by large numbers of tanks, which overwhelmed South Vietnam the 
following year.  Subsequent editions of Walzer’s book (the latest appeared in 2006) offer 
no qualification of the original argument about the “justice” of guerrilla victories.  See 
generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS (4th ed. 2006).  
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the name of a crazed ideology.359  What if insurgents succeed, not because 
they are more popular, but more ruthless in intimidating surrounding 
civilians? 
The moral challenge has reappeared with the Islamic State in Syria and 
Iraq.  It is hard to imagine that the victory of people who engage in public 
beheadings will be a boon for humanity.  That does not prove that those 
who battle ISIS can claim exemption from all restraints on their own war 
methods.  But perhaps the limits may be interpreted with more 
accommodation, given the context of a war in which displays of terrorist 
cruelty are one of the main tactics.360   
The point is not that extremely brutal enemies license countering 
brutality because “they deserve it.”  The point is that an enemy’s depravity 
may make it more urgent to prevail.  When there is greater moral urgency 
for success, there is more claim to invoke Walzer’s “sliding scale” in 
which the just side may justly claim the right to pursue methods of combat 
that would seem improper in other circumstances. 
AP–I purports to impose the same limits not only in all conflicts, but in 
all conditions of compliance, even in conflicts where one side repudiates 
all rules of restraint.  A Red Cross scholar concluded that Israel had 
violated proportionality in its conflict with Hezbollah, while acknowledging 
that Hezbollah had defied the very idea of rules from the outset of the 
conflict.361  The answer, he concluded, was that the international community 
must talk more about international standards.362  Perhaps that is not quite 
sufficient if it gives strategic advantage to the avowed enemies of 
humanitarian restraint.  In practice, Israeli bombing of Lebanese villages, 
which imposed a good deal of destruction and suffering on civilians, 
including bystanders, seems to have exercised a deterrent effect.  In 
subsequent campaigns against the Hamas terror apparatus in Gaza, the 
 
 359.  BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME 458 (1996) (stating that nearly 1.7 million 
Cambodians were killed by Khmer Rouge, about 21% of the 7.9 million person population 
before the guerrillas gained power). 
 360.  As Cannizzaro puts it, the argument is “very seductive indeed” that a state 
cannot be required “to forego its indispensable means of defence and to submit to 
inexorable defeat in order to avoid excessive civilian damage . . . No damage is excessive 
if the ultimate end is self-preservation.” Cannizzaro, supra note 7, at 348. 
 361.  Andrea Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War, in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK 
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 99 (2007). 
 362.  Id. at 141. 
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Lebanese border stayed quiet.363  A sustained campaign on the ground 
would almost certainly have produced more loss and damage to civilians. 
The traditional view, as expressed in the Lieber Code, was that restraints 
in the conduct of war would facilitate a return to peace.  The view was 
always understood to be less persuasive in conflicts involving side(s) not 
much disposed to peace.  The traditional argument for restraint did not 
seem compelling in the extreme situation of the Second World War.  It is 
no credit to the Red Cross that it could see no legal or moral difference 
between Allied bombing of German cities and German genocide of Jews, 
Gypsies, and others on the ground. 
Proportionality is not meaningless, even in extreme conflicts.  Some 
advocates have endorsed the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima, 
but question the need for the atomic strike Nagasaki, before the Japanese 
had time to absorb the meaning of the first attack.364  Some who defend 
bombing of German cities wonder whether it was continued too long.365  
These are by no means frivolous distinctions or idle questions.  Extreme 
situations may justify extreme measures, but do not excuse heedless 
indifference to lives lost.  However, it is one thing to say proportionality 
applies, another to decide what it requires. 
VII.  THE FOG OF WAR AND THE SMOKE OF POLITICS 
The preceding section focused on the moral challenge in seeking to 
apply the same rules to all conflicts with all enemies.  Even if one does 
try to apply the rule set out in AP–I, however, there is bound to be great 
difficulty in applying the proportionality requirement to concrete challenges. 
The proportionality formula in AP–I requires that harm to civilians be 
weighed against “anticipated military advantage.”366  The rule thus assumes 
that commanders can usually forecast the likely effects when they order an 
“attack.”  That assumption may well be questioned, however. If it were easy 
to “anticipate” the consequences of an attack, why would there ever be 
battles?  Why wouldn’t defenders simply anticipate the same consequences 
and so flee from a foredoomed defeat? 
 
 363.  Anshel Pfeffer, Hezbollah refused Hamas request to bomb Israel in Gaza war, 
Shi’a militants feared devastating Israeli response in repeat of 2006 Lebanon war, analysts 
say, HAARETZ, Nov. 10, 2010; Jamie Dettmer, Hezbollah Talks Big but Bows Out of Gaza 
War, DAILY BEAST, (July 23, 2014. 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/23/ 
hezbollah-talks-big-but-bows-out-of-the-gaza-war.html.  
 364.  See, e.g., Barton Bernstein, Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 
135 (1995). 
 365.  See examples cited supra note 341. 
 366.  See AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
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In practice, it is often far from easy to “anticipate” the “military advantage” 
to be gained from an “attack.”  In July of 1916, the British army mounted 
an attack on German trenches near the Somme River in France.  By the 
time the offensive ended, the British army had suffered more than 400,000 
casualties—for a gain of some seven miles.  The French army suffered 
some 200,000 casualties in its efforts to support the British offensive.  
Anglo-French armies together suffered more casualties than the defending 
Germans.367  Seven decades later, Britain’s leading military historian 
described the result this way:  “The Somme marked the end of an age of 
vital optimism in British life that has never been recovered.”368 
What makes that failure most notable is that it did not result from faulty 
intelligence in the run-up to the battle, since the battle continued for four 
months, giving plenty of time to check optimistic “anticipations” against 
experienced realities.  The British commander, Douglas Haig, was not 
removed in the aftermath, but continued to remain in command of British 
forces to the end of the war—and continued to mount hideously costly 
and ineffective offensives, until somewhat similar offensives did finally 
overwhelm exhausted German troops in the last months of the war.369 
Commanders in war can make terrible mistakes.  If we think they are 
inclined to be indifferent to the suffering of civilians on the enemy side, 
we should remember that they can make terrible mistakes even when (as 
at the Somme) they are reckoning almost entirely with the lives of their 
own troops, rather than civilian bystanders.  Commanders do often make 
bad mistakes even in “anticipating” what will yield “military advantage.” 
In mid-February of 1944, Allied armies in Italy found their path blocked 
by German troops entrenched on strategic heights at Monte Cassino.  On 
the heights was an abbey founded by St Benedict in the 6th Century.  
General Eisenhower issued an order reminding troops that such historic 
monuments were landmarks of western civilization and that “[they] are 
bound to respect those monuments as far as war allows.”370  At the same 
time, he indicated the priority of more immediate concerns:  “If we have 
to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own 
men, then our men’s lives count infinitely more and the buildings must 
 
 367.  JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 199 (1998). 
 368.  Id. at 199. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  AMERICAN COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND 
HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS, REPORT 48 (1946). 
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go.”371  The abbey was “blasted by artillery” and then “largely destroyed” 
by “aerial bombardment,” ordered by local Allied commanders.372 
It turned out that German forces had not entered the abbey while it was 
standing, but swarmed into the rubble after these attacks and defended it 
so effectively that the Allied advance was stymied for another three 
months.  The U.S. Army’s own study of the episode concluded that the 
bombing gained “nothing beyond destruction, indignation, sorrow and 
regret.”373  German propaganda denounced Allied “barbarism”—as was to be 
expected.374  The cause of the mistake was simple to understand: 
commanders do not have perfect understanding, even when it comes to 
targets close at hand. 
What is true for immediate battlefield challenges is likely to be even 
more applicable to ancillary tactics, such as the enforcement of a naval 
blockade.  To enforce a blockade, the belligerent’s navy must intercept 
merchant ships heading for the blockaded port.  Naval warships may then 
be drawn into combat operations, causing loss of life to civilians and 
damage to civilian ships and cargoes.  The latter might be considered “civilian 
objects” even if, in the circumstances, they contribute —to some disputable 
extent—to the military resources of the enemy.  What sort of “concrete 
and direct military advantage” can be “anticipated” from a particular attack 
against a particular blockade runner?   
The precise harm to the enemy in losing any one particular cargo might 
be too small to be classified as a “concrete military advantage.”  The 
attack on one ship might well serve to deter future efforts to run the 
blockade, but that “advantage” might be too speculative or indirect to call 
it a “direct military advantage.”375   By this reasoning, since no particular 
effort to enforce a blockade would clearly constitute a “concrete and direct 
 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  Id. at 67. 
 373.  RICK ATKINSON, THE DAY OF BATTLE: THE WAR IN SICILY AND ITALY, 1943–
1944, at 440 (2007). 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  AP–I article 49 seems to limit the convention’s application to naval tactics.  AP–I, 
supra note 1, at art. 49.  Commentators are divided on whether AP–I’s prohibition on using 
“starvation of civilians” as a method of war (art. 54) actually does prohibit naval blockade 
of food shipments. See RAUCH, supra note 220; see also MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW 
RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 380 (2d. ed., 2013) (acknowledging statements 
at the Geneva negotiations that AP–I was not intended to effect the law of naval blockade, 
but suggesting that Art. 70 obligates belligerents to allow passage of relief supplies to 
civilians); Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, Naval Blockade, 75 INT’L L. STUD. 203 n.120 
(listing authors who still question AP–I’s application to naval blockade.)  Even if AP–I 
does prohibit blockades aimed at actual “starvation” of civilians, blockades would still be 
allowed for the interception of military supplies and for other purposes that might impose 
considerable hardship on civilians.   
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military advantage,” one might plausibly conclude that blockades are 
never justified—if the history of war did not prove the contrary. 
Naval blockade is a tactic that can only be fully deployed by countries 
rich enough to maintain sizable fleets.  A similar logic applies, however, 
to the tactics of the weak.  If a belligerent force cannot risk open battle 
against armies in the field, it may resort to guerrilla raids.  Almost by 
definition, guerrilla forces cannot strike a decisive blow against an entire 
army.  When it works, a guerrilla campaign may demoralize the opposing 
forces by creating an atmosphere of insecurity and induce an accumulation 
of blood loss through a thousand small cuts.  No single guerrilla raid, 
however, would make an enemy substantially worse off.  No one raid, by 
itself, would likely give grounds to anticipate “concrete and direct military 
advantage.” 
It might seem to follow that no guerrilla force can ever impose civilian 
casualties, lest it violate the principle of “proportionality.”  The drafters 
of AP–I clearly did not embrace that conclusion, however.  Far from 
discouraging guerilla tactics, AP–I gives special protection for irregular 
combatants, allowing them to practice stealth and disguise in ways that 
are still forbidden to regular armies.376 
Many nations ratifying AP–I recognized the problem of weighing the 
advantage to-be-anticipated in any individual attack in their instruments 
of ratification.  They would adhere to proportionality requirements on the 
understanding that they apply to a campaign as a whole, not to individual 
attacks.377  The Statute of the International Criminal Court, drafted nearly 
a quarter century after the completion of AP–I, implicitly acknowledges 
 
 376.  AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 44, ¶ 3 admonishes that “to promote the protection 
of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population while . . . in a military operation preparatory to an 
attack.”  But, it immediately adds the qualification that “where, owing to the nature of the 
hostilities [that is, guerrilla conflict] an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself,” 
he will still qualify for prisoner of war protections if he “carries arms openly” when “visible 
to the adversary . . . preceding the launching of an attack . . .”  And if even if a fighter does not 
meet this minimal requirement, “he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in 
all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war” under Geneva conventions. Id. at art. 
44, ¶ 4. 
 377.  See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 793–816 for “understandings” 
that “the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage 
anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of that attack,” by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom; see also NEWTON & MAY, supra note 6, at 
114–16 (Discussing the significance of these reservations). 
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the point by rephrasing the AP–I provision to refer to civilian harm “which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.”378 
The ICC Statute also limits the Court’s jurisdiction to “war crimes . . . 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”379  Particular abuses might thus be immunized 
if they occurred in the context of generally correct behavior. That was 
hardly an unknown pattern in earlier wars.  American commanders indulged 
clearly unlawful killing of SS-troops in the last months of the Second 
World War because they recognized special provocations and they expected 
American conduct to be judged by the general pattern.380 
Even with more stringent rules, it is not easy to establish what was or 
should have been known to commanders when it comes to assessing 
responsibility for tactics that impose “excessive” harm to civilians.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, unlike the 
ICC, had many cases in which commanders of undisciplined militia forces 
were charged with abusive attacks.  The tribunal did not find a defendant 
guilty of violating the proportionality rule in a single case.381  If the rule 
is not reduced to automatic guilt when civilians are harmed, it is hard to 
establish guilt in such cases.  
Still more difficult challenges arise when irregular forces do not simply 
launch attacks that threaten civilians on the opposing side, but deliberately 
seek to lure opposing forces to attack civilians in their own community.  
What is a “proportional” amount of injury to “civilians” or “civilian 
 
 378.  Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute] (emphasis added), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1309–1374.  The Elements of Crimes subsequently adopted by 
parties to the ICC Statute further clarifies that the “expression ‘concrete and direct overall 
military advantage’ refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable . . . at the relevant 
time.  Such an advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the 
object of the attack.” Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) (Sept. 9, 2002). 
 379.  ICC Statute, supra note 378, at art. 8(1) (emphasis added).  Similarly, the Court’s 
jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity” is limited to acts “committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack.”  Id. at art. 7(1). 
 380.  MAX HASTINGS, ARMAGEDDON: THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY 209 (2005) (noting 
General Bradley’s tacit acceptance of American practice of refusing to accept surrender 
from SS troops after they massacred surrendered Americans at Malmedy); Rick Atkinson, 
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT: THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944–45, at 613 (2013) (noting 
the refusal of General Patch to allow prosecution of American soldiers who killed German 
guards at Dachau, after they had surrendered). 
 381.  Rogier Bartels, Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed Conflict 
in Retrospect: The Application of the Principle in International Criminal Trials, 46 ISR. 
L. REV. 271, 280 (2013). 
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objects” when defenders deliberately position themselves in the midst of 
civilian areas, using civilians or protected civilian locations (hospitals, 
schools, religious centers, etc.) as “shields”?382  The 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions dealt with the problem by declaring that civilian immunity 
would be forfeited when protected places were used for military purposes.383  
AP–I admonishes belligerents not to position troops or weapons in civilian 
areas—but then insists that such tactics do not absolve the attacker from 
taking precautions to minimize harm to civilians.384 
There is logic to this caution in AP–I.  We do not think police are 
absolved of responsibility to look out for innocent bystanders simply 
because criminals have run into a crowd or seized hostages to protect 
themselves.385  Still, if defenders do not bear at least some responsibility 
for protecting civilians, the rule creates a grotesque incentive . If all 
responsibility for civilian deaths falls on the attackers, then it is in the 
defenders’ interest to make attacks wound or kill as many civilians as 
possible on their own side.  Hence reports that, in Afghanistan, Taliban 
guerillas sought to maximize civilian casualties that could then be blamed 
on U.S. forces.386 In the Gaza conflict, when Israeli forces warned 
civilians to evacuate buildings scheduled for attack, Hamas officials 
demanded that civilians stay in place.387 
 
 382.  AP–I recognizes the problem in prohibiting any “attempt to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations” by directing “movement of the 
civilian population or individual civilians” into the vicinity of military sites. AP–I, supra 
note 1, at art. 51, ¶ 7. 
 383.  1907 version, supra note 32, at art. 27. “All necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes, 
historic buildings, hospitals . . . provided they are not being used at the time for military 
purposes.”  
 384.  “[T]he presence . . . of the civilian population . . . shall not be used to . . . shield 
military objectives from attacks.” AP–I, supra note 1, at art. 51, ¶ 7.   But “any violation 
of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties . . . from their legal obligations with respect to 
the civilian population.” Id. at art. 51, ¶ 8. 
 385.  See Roger Kirst, Constitutional Rights of Bystanders in the War on Crimes, 28 
N. MEX. L. REV. 59 (1998) for many cases asserting rights of bystanders—almost always 
unsuccessfully, but the willingness of courts to consider such claims speaks to the background 
principle. 
 386.  U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Press Conference 
(May 5, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcript 
id=4414. 
 387.  Lawrence Wright, Letter from Gaza: Captives-What really happened during the 
Israeli attacks, THE NEW YORKER 47 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
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American and Israeli military lawyers have pressed the argument that 
responsibility for civilian losses and damage should be at least partially 
attributed to defenders who use civilians as human shields.388  Red Cross 
commentators have firmly resisted this position, insisting that the attacker 
bears sole responsibility for the consequences of the attack, even if the 
defending side tries to make the attack as costly as possible in civilian 
lives and the attacker does the best it can to limit civilian casualties.389 
The least one can say is that the language of AP–I does not clearly 
require the interpretation favored by the Red Cross.  Even further, the Red 
Cross view threatens to violate the interpretive norm that legal texts 
should not be interpreted in ways that yield absurd results.390   
ISIS has threatened terrorist attacks on western States that aid its 
opponents in Syria and Iraq.  Suppose it carried out this threat and many 
European and American civilians thereby lost their lives .  Would 
humanitarian advocates say their deaths were the responsibility of the 
western governments who defied ISIS threats?  Suppose a terror-minded 
government threatened retaliation on civilians to punish resistance.  It is 
not, after all, a hypothetical scenario or even a recent one.  The German 
occupation government in wartime France threatened ten-fold reprisals on 
French civilians for any attacks on German forces by the French resistance.  
German commanders did carry out this threat on a number of occasions—
most terribly against the village of Oradour in June 1944, where everyone 
was murdered and the village completely destroyed (to punish Resistance 
attacks in a completely different place).391  Does the responsibility for these 
atrocities lie with the French resistance?  Entirely? 
 
 388.  NEWTON & MAY, supra note 6, at 219–27; Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai, 
Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 93, 93 (2011); Michael Skerker, Just War Criteria and the New Face of War: 
Human Shields, Manufactured Martyrs, and Little Boys with Stones, 3 J. MIL. ETHICS 
(2004). 
 389.  NEWTON & MAY, supra note 6, at 224 (noting ICRC “interpretative guidance” 
rejects assigning “combatant status”—hence forfeiting civilian immunity—even to voluntary 
shields). 
 390.  For Justice Scalia’s version of the rule, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012) “A provision may be 
either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error False if failing to do so would result 
in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.” Id.  For Scalia’s application of 
the rule in an actual case, see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) 
(interpreting Rules of Evidence, excluding evidence of prior criminal record when 
“prejudicial to the defendant,” to apply only to defendants in criminal cases since “cannot 
rationally” provide benefits to civil defendants when denied to civil plaintiffs).  The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 
authorizes “recourse” to “supplementary means of interpretation” when textual reading 
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
 391.  See MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT 268 (2005). 
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Beyond the legal and philosophical disputes, there remains the political 
dynamic.  As a Canadian military lawyer observed, “civilian losses are 
often concrete, dramatic and emotive.  They lend themselves to powerful 
picture and strong reactions. . . . The contrasting value, military advantage . . . 
cannot generally be photographed.”392  Drawing fire on human shields 
becomes a reasonable tactic, if it stirs international condemnation of the 
attacker and so builds support for the “victims,” even if the entire spectacle is 
stage-managed by terrorists. 
The restrictive view of proportionality lends itself to political propaganda.  
Hence “proportionality” gets turned, in practice, from allowance  to 
attackers—in return for accepting other restraints—into an independent 
weapon for defenders ruthless enough to wield it.  In effect, it generates a 
contest to see which side will flinch first before the spectacle of civilian 
casualties, captured in emotionally powerful pictures.  A reasonable 
expectation is that western democracies will flinch first, meaning the rule 
rewards the most ruthless.  It is hard to see that as a gain for humanity. 
Much of the challenge is inherent in modern communications or in the 
distorting effects of background assumptions about which side had the 
moral high ground.  Still, law should serve to brake demagoguery—not to 
reinforce it. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION:  CAUTION WITH HUMANITARIAN PRECAUTION 
The effort to codify laws of war, at least at the international level, began 
with the Hague Regulations, drafted at the Peace Conference in 1899.  The 
Hague Regulations tried to reduce general understandings to precise rules 
to the extent that seemed feasible.  The best example is the treatment of 
war prisoners.  The Lieber Code, summarizing the prevailing practice, 
acknowledged that in extreme circumstances, commanders might refuse 
to take prisoners, but did not define these circumstances.393  The Hague 
Regulations simply pronounced a blanket rule: denial of quarter was 
simply forbidden.394  Even the Hague Conventions acknowledged that not 
all obligations could be reduced to clear rules.395  If the drafters assumed 
 
 392.  Holland, supra note 8, at 47. 
 393.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 62, at art. 60–61. 
 394.  “[I]t is especially forbidden . . . To declare that no quarter will be given.” 1907 
version, supra note 32, at art. 23(d). 
 395.  “It has not . . . been found possible at present to concert regulations covering all 
the circumstances which arise in practice; On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties 
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some notion of proportionality—as an obligation not to exceed “military 
necessity” in the immediate conflict—they did not think it could be 
expressed in a rule. 
Additional Protocol I was the first successful treaty to incorporate an 
explicit reference to proportionality.  That expressed a new optimism 
about the capacity of legal texts to guide inherently difficult decisions—
here in relation to reasonable intensity of war effort, acceptable or  
unacceptable destructive consequences.  Perhaps AP–I reflected its era. 
There would probably not have been a new Geneva Conference in the 
1970s if not for advocacy, at the United Nations and elsewhere, for 
extending human rights norms to cover situations of armed conflict.  The 
idea for a new convention on the conduct of war was promoted by UN 
resolutions in 1968, explicitly linking humanitarian restraints in war with 
protection for human rights.  The UN General Assembly had endorsed 
final texts of the first international human rights treaties—the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic and Social 
Rights—only two years earlier.  These initial human rights conventions 
had just received sufficient ratifications to take effect when delegates 
assembled in Geneva to negotiate new humanitarian protections in war.  
The human rights treaties tried to implement general endorsements of 
liberty, equality and dignity with elaborate lists of prohibitions and 
entitlements.  AP–I displays a similar approach.  The United Nations 
subsequently included the text of AP–I in a collection of UN human rights 
treaties.396 
There is obvious logic behind the impulse to associate humanitarian 
protections in war with wider guarantees of fundamental human rights.  If 
the world can come together to endorse lists of guaranteed human rights, 
why not guarantee protections for civilians in war?  What is more threatening 
to human rights than being subject to bombardment or attack?  As the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights put it, “[e]veryone is entitled 
to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this declaration can be fully realized.”397 
It might seem paradoxical today, but it was not surprising at the time 
that calls for a new convention to restrain military action were most loudly 
urged by some of the world’s most tyrannical governments.  As a Soviet 
delegate explained in a submission to the UN in 1970, “in the course of 
 
clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, 
be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.” Id. at preamble.  
 396.  1 HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 866–934 
(United Nations, 1994). 
 397.  G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., UN Doc A/810, at art. 28 (Dec. 
10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  
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aggressive wars [waged by] the imperialist States . . . not only are elementary 
human rights violated but frequently a policy bordering on genocide is 
carried out: whole centres of population, together with their peaceful 
inhabitants are annihilated.”398  The convention that emerged from the 
subsequent negotiations in Geneva was, at some level, a clarification by 
western States of the restraints they would try to observe in armed conflict.  
The provision on “proportionality” did not add much clarity, but did preserve 
some room for what western militaries regarded as “military necessity.” 
In the 1970s, most western states still thought they needed to preserve 
some scope for effective military action.  The UN’s solemn declaration 
that “everyone” is “entitled” to a peaceful world had not magically delivered 
such a world—anymore than listing desirable rights in UN declarations 
and conventions had induced tyrannical regimes to respect them. 
Just as peace-loving states may sometimes feel compelled to resort to 
war, states that respect rights may sometimes need to curtail them, especially 
in the context of war.  To insist on rights in abstraction from the context 
is not only misleading, but often self-defeating. 
The challenge of accommodating context is obvious enough in domestic 
settings.  American law tries to protect free speech, but allows police to 
arrest disruptive protestors at public forums, constraining their speech to 
protect the speech rights of others.  After a riot or civil commotion, local 
officials may impose a curfew—limiting people’s right to stroll the streets 
at night so that police can assure order.  It is a restraint on liberty for the 
sake of assuring the conditions that make liberty possible.  To denounce 
such measures without regard to the provocations and dangers they address 
is demagogic. 
It is more urgent to recognize the context in situations of armed conflict.  
To demand precise rules for the conduct of military operations without 
some sense of why or when to fight—to discuss jus in bello in complete 
abstraction from jus ad bellum—is to indulge a fetish about means without 
regard to the ends they serve.  G.W.F. Hegel said war “preserves the 
ethical health of peoples.”399  Friedrich Nietzsche said, “a good war hallows 
 
 398.  U.N. Secretary General, Official Submission by Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, reported in Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/8052, at 118 (Sept. 18, 1970). 
 399.  G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 210 (T.M. Knox, trans., 1965).  “War has 
the higher significance that by its agency . . . the ethical health of peoples is preserved . . . 
just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the 
result of prolonged calm.” Id. 
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any cause.”400  Carl Schmitt said “the essence of political existence” is 
choosing enemies in war.401  These German doctrines glorified armed 
struggle. 
The Swiss doctrine of the Red Cross seems to be the opposite—a 
glorification of restraint in war.  But, it encourages war in its own way, by 
insisting that outcomes do not matter or do not matter enough to affect the 
way we view the rules of the game.  It is a doctrine that rewards the most 
lawless, the most brutal forces, by doing more to constrain their law-
respecting opponents than to inhibit them.  So it is, after all, an enabler for 
those who glorify war and conquest. 
The prohibition on military measures working “excessive” harm to 
civilians may have some value as a statement of aspirations.  It is recognized 
in western military manuals, even in manuals of countries which, like the 
United States, have not ratified AP–I.  However, its application, by sane 
military commanders, must depend on circumstances.  The meaning 
of “proportionality” cannot be settled by an abstract formula, looking only 
to tactical decisions and their immediate consequences.  It certainly cannot 
be settled by the blanket interpretation propounded by the Red Cross, 
which insists that all military “attacks which cause extensive civilian losses 
and destruction”—even attacks which destroy many buildings without killing 
many people—must now be considered unlawful.402 
The appeal of a rule is that it obviates many disputes about  the 
application of a general aim or standard in concrete circumstances.  The 
reason we do not have rules for everything is that we often cannot reduce 
complex considerations to a single fixed rule.  We should not treat the 
proportionality norm as if it were a simple rule.  That is simply offering 
advantage to enemies or demagogues, utopians, or pedants—those who insist 
that conformity to humanitarian obligations must take precedence over 
military necessities.  Humanity often has a greater stake in who prevails 
in war than in how they come to prevail 
If war is too important to be left entirely to the generals, it is too 
important to be left to humanitarian advocates who think the side-effects 
of war are more important than the outcomes. 
 
 400.  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 33 (Adrian del Caro, trans., 
2006).  “You should love peace as the means to new wars. . . .  You say it is the good cause that 
hallows even war?  I tell you, it is the good war that hallows any cause.” Id.  
 401.  CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 49 (George Schwab, trans., 
2007).  “For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must … determine 
by itself the distinction between friend and enemy.  Therein resides the essence of its 
political existence. . . . The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals 
or norms of justice but in its being fought against a real enemy.” Id.   
 402.  RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 626. 
